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Abstract 
 This thesis aims to shed light to what extent, Aznar’s and Zapatero’s foreign 
policy decisions:  the rejection and approval of the European Constitution and the 
invasion and the removal of the troops from Iraq, were taken in light of the Spanish 
public opinion. The objective is to answer the following research question: how José 
Maria Aznar overcame domestic opposition to implement unpopular policies and how 
José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero managed to exploit supportive public opinion to 
implement his chosen foreign policy?  
 Based on public opinion surveys, interviews and document data I conclude that 
Spanish policy making is a result of both bottom up processes wherein leaders are 
responsive to public opinion; and of bottom down process wherein leaders ignore 
public opinion; as well as a process in which leaders managed to manipulate the public 
opinion to ensure that policies that they supported were pursued. This relation between 
policy makers and public opinion is provided by both the type of the policy and the 
two-level game strategies.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A general presentation 
 There is no denying that today foreign policy is becoming similar to domestic 
politics in many states because of the public’s influence on the choices elites make 
(Nincic, 1992; Goldmann, 1985; Shapiro and Page, 1983). This thesis tries to explore 
and understand whether public opinion played a significant role in determining the 
important issues of contention in Spain and whether or not it influenced Spanish Prime 
Ministers, José Maria Aznar and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero to distance themselves 
from their predecessor’s foreign policy and discourse. My thesis will be focused 
primarily on policy regarding the European Union (EU) and security and defense 
policy.  Two different types of foreign policies are analyzed and compared during two 
different political periods: the Spanish participation in the invasion of Iraq and the 
rejection of the Constitution of the European Union during the Popular Party’s (PP) 
administration; contrasted with the withdrawal of the troops from the Iraq conflict and 
the approval of the Constitutional of the EU under the Socialist Party Government 
(PSOE). 
  This thesis assumes that public opinion may adopt different forms of behavior 
and attitudes towards a policy and those leaders may be constrained or empowered by 
the majority. The general objective of this thesis is to determine whether, and to 
what extent, Aznar’s and Zapatero’s foreign policy decisions regarding the cases 
aforementioned were taken in light of the Spanish public opinion.   
1.2 The research question and general objectives 
 In the late 1970’s after almost forty years of authoritarian rule, Spain had a 
political opening and strong desires to enter multilateral organizations such as the 
European Union (at that time the Common European Market) and the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization
1
 (NATO). From the beginning of the transition, (as stated by 
Puente, 2003: 316) the Spanish democratic process was closely linked to the country's 
entry into both institutions. In 1986 Spain became an EU member and since the mid-
1990s their national military forces have increasingly contributed not only in most of 
NATO operations, but also in United Nations and Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP) missions. 
In this respect, Spanish foreign policy was characterized and defined by the 
necessity to engage in multilateral organizations and thus to overcome the isolationism 
inherited from Franco, “placing Spain again in History” (Marín, 2003: 109). However, 
and despite the fact that the principles on which Spanish foreign policy was based 
during the transition were predominantly rooted in European principles, PP’s 
government (1996-2004) surprisingly moved away from this tradition; principally in 
two fronts:  
The first was the decision to involve Spain in the US-lead Iraq War as opposed 
to trying to develop an alternative option through the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CSDP) framework. Secondly, the PP opposed the EU 
Draft Constitution provision concerning the voting system in the Council of 
Ministers, ultimately resulting in the Constitutional debacle in the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Rome on December 2003” (Chari and 
Gwiazda, 2005: 4). 
When the PSOE came into power they had a radically different foreign policy 
in opposition   to PP’s proposals. The PSOE government attempted to resume the 
foreign policy of PP’s predecessors. Firstly, Zapatero made the decision to withdraw 
Spanish troops from Iraq   damaging relations with the U.S but progressing relations 
with the European Union, which had opposed to the invasion. Secondly, Spain’s 
approval of the European Constitution was also considered a way to recover the pro-
European consensus. As noted, “there was a change of vision, perception and action in 
foreign and security policy” (Barbé, 2006). Furthermore, it is also clear that the PP and 
                                                 
1
 Spain officially became part of NATO during the spring of 1982, and while in the beginning public 
opinion was slightly reluctant, today the majority approves of Spain's membership in the Alliance. One 
of the reasons for its approval is it is considered not only an American but mainly a European 
Multilateral Organization. According to Guillermo Puente (2003), Spain's entry into NATO was 
precisely because it was considered a required step to the accession into the European Common 
Market. 
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the PSOE were involved in opposed and incompatible discourses: while on the one 
hand Aznar seemed to consider Spain’s history much closer to an Atlantic and Anglo-
Saxon tradition, Zapatero on the other hand preferred to develop closer relations with 
European countries.  
Overall, both Aznar and Zapatero’s governments had very different objectives 
and ways to achieve them (Shagún, 2004: 265). How can this divergence in foreign 
and security policy position between the two Prime Ministers be understood?   
 In view of the fact that Spanish citizens were strongly against many of Aznar’s 
foreign policy decisions and supported Zapatero’s approach to a more conciliatory and 
compromising policy, the factor explaining the drastic change in foreign policy can be 
attributed to public opinion.. However, even though outcomes in foreign policy can 
often be attributable to the preferences of the majority, Chari and Gwiaazda (2005: 2) 
have argued that many times international policies may be a result of numerous and 
diverging domestic actor-based pressures and incentives on which a government 
depends for political support. These include: those in power, the party in government, 
preferences of domestic interest groups that lean on the government and bureaucracies 
or personal. 
According to Robert Putman, governments select policies from a range of 
feasible options, not only due to domestic actors’ preferences but also because of 
international negotiators’ motivations. State leaders find themselves in a very 
complicated situation in which they should try to formulate and implement foreign 
policies that balance preferences, power and negotiation strategies of domestic players 
and other governments. The point of departure stems from the supposition that a leader 
who fails to satisfy both players risks being evicted from his seat (Putman, 1988:434). 
Putnam conceptualized this hypothesis for domestic and international 
interactions as a two-level game. He maintained that foreign policy making has to be 
understood as taking place on two levels: Level I, the international level; and Level II, 
the domestic. The author adds that governments and their representatives when trying 
to manipulate and frame domestic and international pressures make use of different 
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strategies in both levels to convince their constituency and the opposing negotiators 
that their course of action is the best and only possible solution. 
 Taking for granted that governments select certain foreign policy options from a 
wide range of possibilities that are dependent on the restraints and preferences of 
national and international actors, the purpose of my research is to answer the following 
research question: How José Maria Aznar overcame domestic opposition to 
implement unpopular policies and how José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero managed 
to exploit supportive public opinion to implement his chosen foreign policy? In 
other words, how far do two-level games go towards describing and explaining on 
the one hand the rejection and approval of the European Constitution and on the 
other the invasion and the removal of the troops from Iraq?  
1.3 The selection of the (two different) study cases 
 The selection of the two different types of foreign policy options analyzed in 
this thesis has several different motivations.  
Firstly, the Iraq invasion was a significant policy decision largely followed in 
Spain and which set a precedent for fighting rouge states in anticipatory self-defense. 
The European Constitution on the other hand it was a milestone in the history of the 
European Union, so it is important to study the consequences the constitution had on 
Spain. 
 Secondly, it is surprising how Spanish leaders have managed, in general, to 
ignore majority opinion and large demonstrations against different economic and 
social issues, especially with today’s on-going economic crisis. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to provide evidence as to the role of public opinion in foreign policy 
decision making.   
 Thirdly, the reason why I ended up writing about two very different policies is 
because it enriches my research by adding one more variable to the study: namely the 
type of policy. It leads to an interesting discussion on how the foreign policy making 
process is done in contemporary democracies.  
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1.4 Specific objectives 
  The rationale of the hypothesis (Goldman, 1986) is that democracies cannot 
function in a fully democratic manner when foreign policy is concerned. Mainly 
because it is characterized by secrecy, control of information and also due to the fact 
that foreign policy questions are too central to the survival of the state to be left to the 
same interplay of forces as domestic policies. However, while today’s national 
interests are not the traditional ones anymore, this thesis has been somewhat diluted. 
According to Goldmann, the level of public involvement varies depending on the type 
of the policy and whether it is a diplomatic security policy, defense policy, foreign 
economic policy or an internationalist policy.  
 The specific objectives of this thesis are, one, to describe and analyze in detail 
the two foreign policies: the invasion and withdrawal from Iraq, characterized as a 
defense policy, and the European Constitution, defined as an internationalist policy; 
two, to establish a relationship between leaders playing a two-level game and the 
effect of democracy on the chosen policy outcomes.  
1.5 The research  
 The analysis begins in chapter two by reviewing the literature on two-level 
games and the rationale of the hypothesis related to foreign policy. The third chapter 
addresses the methodological problem and the use of existing research.  In chapters 
four and five I give a historical introduction as well as a characterization of public 
opinion and the leaders’ discourses. In chapter six I analyze both cases in light of Kjell 
Goldmann’s and Putman’s theory. Chapter seven then concludes this thesis and 
reiterates my findings. 
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2 THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
 Theoretical approaches explaining the decision-making process in foreign 
policy have historically dealt with different and –sometimes- opposing points of view. 
Even though the premise that public opinion affects foreign policy is now widely 
accepted among political scientists, some scholars have questioned the plausibility of 
such influence, especially in the security domain. This chapter compares the different 
schools and their views on public opinion’s influence on foreign political processes: 
Realist versus Liberalist. I introduce this discussion because the main objective of this 
thesis is to determine to what extent the majority may affect policy making.  
The strongest argument against public opinion’s influence on foreign policy-
making has been the argument that international politics is inherently incompatible 
with Democracy, when defined as citizens’ right to have their opinion heard 
(Goldmann, 1986). Kjell Goldmann however, has reconsidered such hypothesis 
claiming that foreign policy decisions are concerned with democratic issues depending 
on the type and substance of the decision. On the one hand, Goldmann’s description 
and differentiation of the different types of foreign policy helps to describe and 
analyze in detail the two foreign policies and to answer: how could the nature of the 
policy be affecting the policy making and what is the determining factor with regard to 
potential actors? This research also allows us to examine the relationship between 
leaders’ justifications to avoid domestic opposition and to exploit supportive public 
opinion and the democratic support of policies.  
 Robert Putnam's two-level game theory is very useful in identifying key 
dimensions that could help explain how public opinion is considered as a determinant 
of foreign policy. 
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2.2 Public Opinion and foreign policy 
According to Shamir (2000), public opinion has: an evaluative component, a 
normative component, a prospective informational component, and an expressive 
behavioral element. The evaluative dimension of public opinion consists of the 
aggregate distributions of personal attitudes, which have become the dominant wishes 
of public opinion, commonly determined by opinion polls. The normative facet is 
often described as the majority opinion that can apply social sanctions. The 
prospective informational facet represents the public’s aggregate foresight and 
expresses the basic human need to form a valid view of reality.  The fourth element of 
public opinion is its behavioral facet.  
Public opinion in this thesis is defined in an evaluative and behavioral aspect. It 
is described as the collection of views and attitudes towards a determined policy, 
which is at the same time, the dominant opinion of society regarding a specific policy. 
Public opinion can influence judgment in that political action and can be able or 
unable to influence or affect policy makers’ decisions.  
While there might be a disagreement on the degree of the impact of public 
opinion on internal or domestic policy, there is a general consensus that public opinion 
influences national leaders. Nevertheless, when it comes to foreign policy this 
assumption has been questioned. It has been argued by realists that the public has no 
meaningful opinion or any organized interest in foreign policy.  
 The realist school’s argument is that state behavior is examined from the 
perspective of external rather than internal forces to the state (White, 1989: 11.); 
therefore public opinion as a domestic factor would not compel states or their strategic 
decisions. Arguments in support of the realist view can be found in many influential 
authors like Walter Lipmann, Hans Morgenthau, John J. Mearshmeier, and Gabriel 
Almond, among many others.  
 According to Lippmann (1955: 20), mass opinion is volatile, lacks in structure, 
is incoherent, and has unfortunately compelled governments to act in ways that were 
not in the states’ best interests, even when the state usually knew what would have 
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been wiser, or that it was necessary to act in another way for an optimal outcome. 
Consequently, in the author’s view public opinion should be considered a dangerous 
and irrational force that should be limited. In addition, the mood theory of Gabriel 
Almond maintains that public opinion is indifferent to foreign policy and responds 
only to immediate threats; it constitutes a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response 
(Shapiro and Page, 1988: 212) which “has a highly irrational effect (since) often the 
public is apathetic when it should be concerned and panicky when it should be calm” 
(Almond, 1956: 372-376).  
 Morgenthau, in a similar pessimistic vein, mentions that “the rational 
requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a 
public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational” (Holsti, 2000: 
120). Going further, Mearsheimer observes that public opinion on national security 
issues is “notoriously fickle and responsive to elite manipulation and world events” 
(Foyle, 1983: 5).  Rodger A. Payne also comments that “foreign policy elites can 
simply and cynically manipulate rhetoric to assure wider support for their desired 
policies” (Payne, 2007: 505). Briefly, these authors conclude that elites should either 
ignore public opinion or persuade them to support their chosen policy.  
 In contrast to realists, liberals argue that public opinion is coherent, structured, 
stable and rational. Even though there might be a disagreement in the extent and 
degree that public opinion shapes policy decision, there has been a consensus in that 
political elites respond to public opinion when making foreign policy decisions. Bruce 
Russett (1990: 110) observed that public opinion has an effect on international policy 
mostly by “identifying a range of policies in which decision makers can choose, and in 
which they must choose if they are not to face rejection in the voting booths”. In a 
similar line of work, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1991: 510) found that public opinion in 
most cases sets broad and unspecified limits to the foreign policy choices. According 
to Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (1983: 189) “public opinion, whatever its 
sources and quality, is a factor that genuinely affects government policies”. The 
channels, argues Gabel (1998: 333), through which the public influences politics are 
mainly lobbying, public protests and elections. 
 9 
 The aforementioned perspectives have transformed members of the general 
public from passive and largely voiceless spectators to important actors in world 
politics. However, even though the liberal approach recognizes that public opinion 
could be a significant factor in foreign policy making, several relevant questions to this 
thesis remain unanswered. Given that this study concentrates on two different cases of 
foreign policy decision making, it is crucial to ask whether public opinion in the 
process of policy making concerns leaders in the same way in both cases. An 
explanation of Kjell Goldmann’s main arguments will allow us to answer how the 
nature of the policy could also be affecting the policy making and to determine 
whether there is any relation between leaders playing a two-level game and the 
democratic level of the policies. On the other hand, two-level game theory will help to 
determine if the majority has an impact on leaders and if they are paying attention to it 
or ignoring it. The logic of two-level games proposed by Robert Putnam is considered 
in the next section. 
2.3 A reconsideration of the incompatible 
hypothesis 
 According to the incompatible hypothesis, foreign policy is made in a special 
way that is different from domestic policy, which is democratically constructed. 
According to Goldmann (1986), various ideas have been put forward about the relation 
between democracy and international politics, and why they cannot function together. 
These can be summarized in three basic principles of political action.  
 The first idea underlying the incompatibility hypothesis can be called the 
principle of bargaining with outsiders. Consistent with this principle, the necessity of 
bargaining makes it inevitable that it is left to professionals, to those who know the 
adversary and how to bargain. Therefore, the most obvious implication of the 
bargaining principle is that foreign policies are made in secrecy, insulating the 
procedure and administration from outside scrutiny (Goldmann, 1986: 5-6). The 
second argument is the principle of the supreme interest, which refers to the notion 
that the supreme common interest is at stake in foreign policy; hence, citizens should 
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not afford to debate freely and openly about such matters. The third principle is 
remoteness, and concerns that “foreign policies deal with matters that may ultimately 
affect the individual citizen far more than domestic issues” (Goldmann, 1986: 7-8).   
The three principles mentioned here will allow us to specifically answer how 
the nature of the policy is affecting the policy making and which is the determining 
actor-based factor. The principle of bargaining will determine the room for the 
citizenry to give an opinion, the supreme interest if the policy is important for leaders 
and the principle of remoteness whether policy is important for the public.  
 Putting together the principles, foreign policy making runs against democracy 
and what Goldmann (1986: 17-24) considered being the three main characteristics of 
an idealized model of democratic policy: access to information, participation and 
representation. The latter, “usually thought to imply that some link ought to exist 
between the preferences of the public and the decision of their representatives” 
(Goldmann, 1986: 17). Goldmann also argued that low representation on an issue, may 
reflect the preferences of voters (idem). Participation is limited in the various stages of 
policy making because of potential interference from groups such as bureaucracies, 
interest organization pressures, elections, etc. Regarding information, an ideal 
democratic policy would be one where everybody would have correct and complete 
knowledge.  
 Kjell Goldmann has raised an objection to this, proposing a less rigid theory 
that depends on the type of foreign policy. Whereas in the incompatibility theory 
policy making with regard to domestic issues often approaches a democratic ideal it 
rarely does in the case of foreign policy.  According to Goldmann the level of 
democracy and public involvement would vary according to whether the policy is a 
diplomatic security policy, defense policy, foreign economic policy or an 
internationalist policy. My research examines both defense and internationalist 
policies.   
Defense policy is traditionally regarded as the chief task of the Ministry of 
Defense and the internationalist policy will be used to denote “such international 
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politics that tend to improve conditions generally by the application of norms thought 
to be universally valid rather than to further one’s own immediate national interests” 
(Goldmann, 1986: 28). 
 The ambiguity of the incompatibility hypothesis (table 2.1.) suggests that the 
three principles that justify the incompatibility appear to be valid only in the case of 
diplomatic security policy (Goldmann, 1986: 29). Defense policy on the contrary, 
seems to be a concern of ordinary people. “Internationalism on the other hand, 
suggests the possibility of policy making under conditions of bargaining and 
remoteness about interests that are less supreme in the traditional sense” (Goldmann, 
1986: 30). 
 Concerning the three democratic characteristics (table 2.2), policy making 
follows the incompatibility hypothesis only in the case of diplomatic security policy. 
First, with respect to defense policy, voters and parties are active in the making of the 
policy; hence, defense policy seems to be similar to the domestic policy. Second 
regarding the level of participation, decisions are limited to a few top politicians acting 
in conjunction with the bureaucracy (except during a crisis). Finally, the information 
the public holds is incomplete. Internationalist policies, on the other hand, combine 
three features in a useful way: “that have ideological overtones, there are no well-
organized domestic interest with which one must bargain; and they are unimportant in 
the sense that one’s impact on developments is likely to be small” (Goldman, 1986: 
34). It is important to keep this differentiation in mind to verify whether Goldmann’s 
theory is fulfilled. 
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Table 2.1: The relevance of the three principles for different types of political issues 
 Bargaining Supreme interest Remoteness 
Diplomatic security policy yes yes yes 
Defense policy yes yes no 
Foreign economic policy yes no no 
Internationalist policy yes no yes 
Domestic policy no no no 
Source: (Goldmann, 1986; 29) 
 
 
Table 2.2: Representation, participation and information for different types of issues: 
summary of the hypothesis 
 Domestic 
Policy 
International Policy 
  Diplomatic 
security 
policy 
Defense 
policy 
Foreign 
economic 
policy 
Internationalist 
policy 
Representation well2 
functioning 
malfunctions 
but 
consensus 
relatively well 
functioning 
relatively well- 
functioning 
malfunctions, no 
consensus 
Participation tripartite primarily 
bureaucratic 
primarily 
bureaucratic 
in crisis, 
moderately 
tripartite in 
non-crisis 
tripartite bureaucratic, 
political, or ad 
hoc 
Information rich and 
varied 
poor and 
biased 
incomplete relatively rich 
and varied 
relatively rich 
and varied 
Source: (Goldmann, 1986; 32) 
 
                                                 
2
 Well functioning means: the voters form opinions on some issues; the candidates provide a 
significant number of votes for a program that is reasonably similar to the public’s  views on issues 
that are important to them: information is available to the voters; the representatives once elected, act 
in accordance with their stated objectives; and the voters monitor their representatives. 
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 In summary, foreign policy could be made in the same way as domestic policies 
depending on the type of the international policies. In Defense policy, for example, the 
public is able to form an opinion and the leaders to provide a significant number of 
votes for a program that is reasonably similar to the public’s wishes. However, with 
regard to an internationalist policy the leaders most likely would not follow the 
majority’s preferences.  
Connecting the two-level game theory with what Goldmann has defined to be the 
main three characteristics of democracy we will be able to determine when a policy is 
democratic, seems to be democratic or is autocratic. 
2.4 The Two-level Game Theory  
 “From the perspective of the two-level framework the process of many 
international negotiations as well as most of foreign policy decision-making is a 
function of incentives and constraints both on the international (level I) and on the 
domestic level” (Level II). According to Putman (1988: 32), because central decision 
makers disagree about what the national interest is on nearly all important issues and 
what the international context demands, governments work as gatekeepers between 
these two levels try to “balance potentially conflicting international and domestic 
pressures”, and to “formulate and implement foreign policies that satisfy both” 
(Bosold & Opermann, 2006: 3). At the national level domestic groups
3
 pursue their 
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies to them. At the 
international “governments seek to maximize their degrees of freedom, to satisfy 
domestic pressures and to limit the harmful impact of foreign developments” (Shamir 
& Shikaki, 2005: 311-312). 
 Putman’s hypothesis argues the supposition that politicians or any leader who 
fails to satisfy his fellow players risks being evicted from his seat (Putman, 1988:434). 
Putman has proposed that these domestic constrains on negotiators are captured by the 
concept of win-set.  
                                                 
3
 The actors at Level II may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even 
"public opinion." 
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 The concept of governmental win-sets can be defined as “the entirety of foreign 
policy actions on the international level which a government can successfully ratify 
both formally and informally on the domestic level” (Moravcsik, 1993: 23). In other 
words, the win sets are all the theoretically possible negotiated agreements at level I 
that all the parties in the negotiations can agree to and that will be ratified at Level II. 
All these agreements on foreign policy according to Putnam derive from the size and 
location of domestic win-sets (Bosold & Opermann, 2006: 3). Putnam has advanced 
two important hypotheses concerning the impact of domestic win-sets on international 
agreements. The first is that the smaller the level II win-set, the greater the risk that 
negotiations will break down, and the opposite, the larger the level II win-sets, the 
greater the chance of a Level I agreement. The second is that a small win-set can be 
also a bargaining advantage. 
 The first hypothesis may derive from the fact that “the larger the perceived win-
set of a negotiator, the more he/she can be “pushed around” by the other Level I 
negotiators” (Putnam 1988:440). The second hypothesis on the other hand can be 
understood from the idea that while the level II win-set will often be misrepresented by 
the negotiator on Level I, the other level I negotiator must then grant concessions in 
order to secure an agreement for all. This means that the government can get a better 
deal if its domestic base has its hands tied. 
 To put it in another way, the greater the autonomy of central decision makers 
from domestic pressures the more likely the states are to achieve an agreement. 
Nevertheless, the controversy is that the stronger a government is the weaker its 
relative international bargaining position will be (Putman, 1988: 449).  Consequently, 
governments may either seek to widen or to reduce their respective win-sets. In 
accordance with Putman (1988: 44), “clever players will spot a move on one board 
that will trigger realignments on other boards enabling them to achieve otherwise 
unattainable objectives”. In this way, state leaders would use different techniques to 
overcome domestic constraints and to increase incentives: 
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1. One effective way to widen the scope of foreign policy decisions is to rally 
support from one's constituents.  
2. In contrast, “executives can choose to ride the unsupportive climate of 
opinion and further delegitimize a normatively unpopular solution” (Shamir 
and Shikaki 2005: 325).  
3. Schelling (1980:21-2) postulates that negotiators can also convince the other 
party that his win-set is small. The negotiator might say that what the 
opponent proposes cannot be ratified at Level II, though this might not be 
true: “I'd like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at 
home"
4
 (Putman, 1988: 440). 
4. “Informed negotiators can exploit ignorance to expand the other side’s win-
set by modifying its public’s erroneous perceptions without risking too 
much their own domestic standing”. Ignorance affords leaders greater 
flexibility in maneuvering public opinion according to their purposes and 
preferences (Shamir & Shikaki, 2005: 325).  
5. According to Putman (1988: 450), side-payments to attract marginal 
supporters have often been used in practical politics. 
6. According to Moravcsik (1993: 24-30) governments can enhance flexibility 
on the international level by “cutting slack” in the ratification process.  
7. The governmental strategy of “tying one’s hands” at the international level 
can be used to deliberately reduce one’s domestic leeway.  
8. Vice versa, “tying one’s hands” at the national level can be used to 
deliberately reduce one’s international leeway. 
 Putnam’s (1988: 450) general model suggests that governments seek 
international self-binding (to tie their hands at the international level) when they are 
weak (have a lack of domestic approval) at home and want to strengthen its 
international bargaining position. He suggests that governments can impose an 
international agreement arguing that a supranational entity such as the European Union 
                                                 
4
 Jane Haaland Matlary (2009; 5) mentioned that domestic constraints can be used to get one’s way in  
an international organization –in fact, the more bound one is, the more one may gain because other 
states that want to reach an agreement and have larger scope for negotiation may be forced to concede 
much more than they would normally. 
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or NATO is bound to implement it. Thus, it is advantageous to be constrained by level 
I if level II actors strongly disagree with a measure.   
 Janne Haaland Matlary (2009: 5) argues that in security and defense policy 
executives use the level II as a multiplier for their interests when things go wrong.  She 
maintains that governments “need to have a second level for political risk and burden 
sharing” (Matlary, 2009: 97). Furthermore, Milner (1997: 20-23) states that because 
governments in the level II enjoy privileged access to information with respect to their 
citizens, they engage in blame avoidance and credit claiming exercises to selectively 
mobilize domestic support for their foreign policies. 
 According to Putnam (1988: 457), the two-level strategies are costly and risky 
for the chief negotiator. Nonetheless, the most important reason for playing is to 
enhance leaders’ standing in the Level II game by increasing their political resources 
or by minimizing potential losses. “For example, a head of government may seek the 
popularity that he expects to accrue to him if he concludes a successful international 
agreement, or he may anticipate that the results of the agreement (for example, faster 
growth or lower defense spending) will be politically rewarding” (Putnam, 1988: 457). 
 In general, what can be concluded from the two-level game is that executives 
use their exclusive access to both levels to overcome potentially troublesome public 
opinion and international pressures exploit the supportive majority to reach an 
agreement.  
2.5 Conclusion  
 The impact that public opinion could have on foreign policy would depend on 
the type of the international policy. While defense is the most democratic aspect of 
foreign policy, internationalist policy is the least representative and participative. 
According to Putman’s theoretical model, the government would be strong when 
tacking internationalist foreign policy decision and weak as regards with defense 
policy. Following his two-level game theory strong national executives would also try 
to avoid public opinion by making moves on the level I and level II boards. This 
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captures the essence of the problem: the main purpose of foreign policy is to make 
domestic policies compatible, confirming the importance of domestic factors in 
foreign policy. Are Aznar and Zapatero also trying to make their policies compatible 
with the majority’s preferences? 
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3 METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis is a comparative study between two different cases, which by the 
systematic study of the similarities and differences between them attempts to yield 
useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy patterns from the political 
realities of Spain. This chapter aims to give a brief explanation of what a case study is 
and what the comparative method is. It explains how general and specific objectives 
are operationalized and which sources are employed for each of the dependent and 
independent variables. Finally, this chapter discusses if the method and the sources 
used are adequate and sufficient to tackle the research questions of the thesis.  
3.2 Comparing case studies 
 A case study “is an instance of a class of events” where the purpose is to 
“develop theory regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances of 
that class of events” according to George et al. (2005: 17-18). The term “class of 
events” refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of 
governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types, etc. (Idem).  
“A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator 
selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself,” (George, et al., 2005: 18). 
This study’s unit of analysis (class of event) is Spanish foreign policy focused on 
Aznar and Zapatero’s governments.  
 The earlier definition of a case was a single measure on any pertinent variable, 
and thus, case studies relied on a distinction between the study of a small versus a 
large number of instances (George, et al., 2005: 17). Today case studies vary in 
complexity – from a single unit of observation to multiple observations at different 
points in time and level of analysis (Gerring, 2004). The units of observation in this 
thesis are a) two political periods (the Aznar and Zapatero governments) b) two types 
of foreign policies (defense and internationalist policies). 
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 A case study can also vary in ambition –from explanatory description to explicit 
hypothesis testing (Rueschemeyer, 2003). Hypothesis testing:  
Can be understood in terms of a general positive test strategy. This strategy, 
you test a hypothesis by examining instances in which the property or event is 
expected to occur (to see if it does occur), or by examining instances in which 
it is known to have occurred” (Klayman &Won Ha, 1987:212). 
 Proponents of case studies argue that hypothesis testing can be used if the case 
is strategically selected with reference to a theory (George & Bennet; 2005). 
According to the research question this study should be characterized as hypothesis 
testing. The strategy is to test four instances or events in the Spanish foreign policy 
and to see if two level games and Goldmann’s theory explain those events.  
 According to Eisenhardt (1987: 536-537), the selection of the cases is an 
important aspect in hypothesis testing. George et al. (2005: 30-31) claim that case 
research does not aspire to select cases that are directly “representative” (of a 
population or class of events) but that the selection of the case should provide the 
strongest possible inference on a particular theory. In this thesis the selection of the 
two very different cases is primarily due to the fact that both are at extreme positions, 
hence, the theory can be both corroborated and disproved. It may also identify the 
other variables that could explain why certain decisions were made.  In the case of this 
thesis the actor-based factors (apart from public opinion) that leaders act in response 
to. One of the cases is the most likely to prove and the other the least likely to prove 
two-level game theory. Another reason for selecting these cases is that they are not 
only useful to test the theories, but also to produce limited generalizations from their 
similarities and differences
5
.  
 There is potential for confusion among the terms “comparative methods” and 
“case study methods” (George et al., 2005: 18) since, most of the time, they have been 
understood as opposed. “The comparative method (the use of comparison among a 
small number of cases) is distinct from the case study method, which in this view 
involves the internal examination of singles cases”. However, there is a growing 
                                                 
5
  According to Kalleberg (1966) the hypothesis-testing function of comparison allows the elimination 
of rival explanations about particular events, actors, structure in an effort to help build more general 
theories. 
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consensus that “the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use 
of a combination of within case analysis and cross-case comparison” (Idem). To 
reiterate, this research is using both methods.  
 On a general level, comparativists are interested in identifying the similarities 
and differences between macro-social units, because these are essential to the 
explanations that comparatives offer: interpreting diverse historical outcomes and 
processes and their significance for current institutional arrangements (Ragin, 1987: 
6). Nevertheless, even though this macro-social unit is very important and essential to 
catalogue comparative methods, (according to Ragin (1987)), it would be wrong to 
conclude that comparatives differ from non-comparatives because of their “chosen 
units of analysis”. In comparative research all units of analysis can be used, all that 
matters is how the results of the research are understood. In fact, in comparative social 
analysis the examination proceeds at one level (usually the individual), and the 
explanation at another level (usually the macro-social) (Ragin, 1987). In this case, the 
individual level is the two foreign policy cases and the macro-social level is Spanish 
foreign politics. 
 As maintained by Ragin (1987: 53), the strength of a comparative study 
between different cases (that should provide the strongest possible inference on a 
theory), is mostly an evidence-oriented strategy. 
 Although the terms qualitative and case study are often used interchangeably, 
the evidence, in a case study where the aims are to provide description, to test theory 
and to generate theory by comparison, may be qualitative, quantitative, or both 
(Eisenhard, 1989). Moreover, the combination of data types can be highly synergistic 
(Yin, 1984). The use of a specific valuation method depends on the circumstances of 
the case and should be made in function of the research question and objectives. The 
following is a more detailed explanation of the evidence used for each of the 
objectives and variables as well as the manner they were interpreted. 
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3.3 Operationalization 
3.3.1 General Objective 
To determine whether, and to what extent, Aznar and Zapatero’s foreign policy 
decisions (concerning Iraq and the European Constitution) were made in light of the 
Spanish public opinion. 
1. Dependent variable (Y): Policy making, understood as the process in which a 
(foreign) policy is produced through interaction between different actor-based 
factors. In this interaction, leaders as the main policy makers pay either much, little 
or no attention to the different players that could be influencing the outcome of a 
policy. In this case, public opinion only is considered. 
1. Independent variable (X): Public opinion, defined as the collection of views and 
attitudes towards a determined policy, which is at the same time the dominant 
opinion of a society regarding that policy. Public opinion is also an actor-based 
factor that may affect policy makers, possibly empowering or constraining them. 
                                          
POLICY MAKING         (+) 
    
 
 
   Pay    B  
                  attention      C 
              D 
                                      A 
                       (-)        
                            (+)       
    Constrain      Empower  
       PUBLIC OPINION 
A: Foreign policy 1        B: Foreign policy 2         C: Foreign policy 3       D: Foreign policy 4 
Figure 3.1: Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables 
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 Figure 3.1 shows the operationalization of the variables.  Letters A, B, C and D 
are hypothetically situated and correspond to each of the policies analyzed in the 
investigation, which are placed on the graphic depending on what extent leaders pay 
attention to their constituency and where the public opinion constrains or empowers 
leaders. Foreign policy 1 is the invasion of Iraq, 2 the rejection of the EU Constitution, 
3 the removal of the troops from Iraq and 4 the approval of the EU Constitution.  
3.3.2 Measuring the independent variable 
 Independent variables are factors hypothesized to have a causal influence on the 
dependent variable. As mentioned in the introduction, the factors influencing policy 
making are 1) personal and party interests 2) bureaucracies 3) interest groups 4) public 
opinion. To approach the first three factors I have carried out a literature review and a 
brief analysis. However, since it is public opinion that I am interested in, a more 
intensive and detailed examination must be done using international and national 
public surveys.  
 To measure how public opinion may affect policy making two concepts are 
brought up: constrainment and empowerment. Public opinion constraining policy 
makers is understood as the majority setting up limits to the leaders’ ranked set of 
strategic preferences over actions (those strategic actions for example could vary from 
offensive strategies to more accommodationist and diplomatic tools). People may 
constrain leaders when they do not agree with them.  
 On the other hand, that the majority empowers policy makers indicates that 
leaders gain control and authority over a specific issue so they can take the initiative 
and make decisions. Citizens may empower leaders when both share similar thoughts 
regarding a specific matter. 
  The public might also be neutral, and have no interest in a controversy, dispute, 
or issue in which they are directly or indirectly involved. In this case, leaders will also 
gain control over the decision. However, this authority would not have been given 
willingly by their constituency.  
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 The meaning of the public being against, neutral or supportive of a foreign 
policy is summarized in Table 3.1 
Table 3.1: Indicators of the independent variable 
 
Constrain 
 
Public opinion is against 
The majority is in opposition to 
foreign affairs policies taken by 
the leaders 
 
Neutral 
 
Public opinion is neutral 
The majority is indifferent 
towards a foreign policy 
decision 
 
Empower 
 
Public opinion supports 
The majority gives its approval 
towards a foreign policy 
decision 
 To determine in which position Spanish public opinion was in relation to the 
invasion of Iraq, the removal of the troops and the rejection and then approval of the 
European Constitution, I have looked at three surveys of public opinion: 
1. Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE): is a regular survey, held three 
times a year (November, February and June) with a sample of 1,200 people. 
The Barometer pays attention to the Spanish foreign policy (defense, country 
image, attitudes towards the European Union, perceived threats and conflicts, 
etc.) The surveys I examined are the general surveys of December 2002, 
February and November 2003, February and May 2004 and the General and 
Autonomic Post electoral survey 2004. 
 
2. Barómetro del Centro de Estudios Sociológicos: is a survey made on a monthly 
basis, except for August, and measures Spanish public opinion on different 
topics. The sample is around 2,500 randomly selected people. The surveys 
examined are from March 2000 to January 2005. 
3. The Standard Eurobarometer: is a survey that addresses the major topics 
concerning European citizenship: enlargement, the social situation, health, 
culture, information technology, the environment, the Euro, defense, etc. Each 
survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. The 
Standard Eurobarometer analyzed are Nº 55 (Spring 2001), Nº 56 (Autumn 
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2001), Nº57 (Spring 2002), Nº 58 (Autumn 2002), Nº 59 (Spring 2003), Nº 60 
(Autumn 2003), Nº 61 (Spring 2004) and Nº 62 (Autumn 2004). 
 Some of the questions selected for this research are the following: 
Questions about the invasion of Iraq: 
1. How much do you agree with the following statements? Every war is a blight 
on everyone/ sometimes war is unavoidable/ sometimes it is necessary to use 
force to maintain international security/ during war it is possible that there will 
be no civilian victims/ even in the case of tyrannical and dangerous regimes the 
international community should not intervene/ military intervention should 
never occur. 
2. Hypothetically do you support an American invasion of Iraq? 
3. How would you justify a possible invasion of Iraq? If we had knowledge that 
Iraq was developing nuclear weapons and/or other weapons of mass 
destruction/ if we had knowledge that Iraq helped the terrorist attacks of 
September 11
th
 perpetrated against the US/ if we were sure Iraq planned to 
invade Kuwait again/ if the majority of the Iraqi population were repressed by 
the regime and the intervention may help liberate them/ if the supply of oil is 
threatened in Spain and other developed countries.  
4. What do you think the military should do? They should follow the US-led 
coalition and stay the course; whether or not other countries enter the war/ they 
should stay, but only if more countries are also involved in the coalition/ they 
should stay but only if it is within an UN-led multinational force/ they should 
return to Spain under any circumstances. 
5. The first decision made by José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero as Prime Minister 
was the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Iraq. This decision was very 
good, good, fair, bad or very bad? 
6. Spain has sent a military force to Iraq to engage in humanitarian missions. Do 
you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree 
with this decision? 
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7. How do you assess the actions of the Spanish government in the Iraq crisis? 
8. Will the war in Iraq change your vote in the upcoming local and regional 
elections? 
9. Do you follow closely the news about the conflict in Iraq? 
10. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, agree a little or not agree at all with 
some form of international action on Iraq? 
11. Do you think that  the terrorist attacks in Madrid would have occurred if Spain 
had not supported the U.S. in Iraq? 
Questions about the European Constitution 
1. Do you think the European Union should have a Constitution? 
2. Are you in favour or against having a European Constitution?  
3. Do you think that the adoption of this Constitution will be very important, 
somewhat important, little or not important for the future of Europe? 
4. Do you know and follow the work of the European Convention that since last 
year 2002 is preparing a constitution for the European Union?  
5. During June the final text of the European Constitution was approved, did you 
have knowledge of this? 
6. The Prime Minister has announced the call for a referendum to approve the 
European Constitution. Are you in favour or against this referendum? 
7. Would you say that your level of knowledge about the content of the European 
Constitution is very high, high, low, very low or none? 
8. Why do you think your knowledge on the European Constitution is very low?  
9. Do you know the views of the party you feel closer to regarding the European 
Constitution? 
10. Do you share the point of view of the party you support regarding the European 
Union? 
11. Why have you decided to vote affirmatively in the referendum? 
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3.3.3 Measuring the dependent variable 
   To pay attention to public opinion means that leaders heed the majority when 
making decisions in policy making. On the contrary, not to pay attention to public 
opinion indicates that leaders are not taking heed to majority opinion. To measure the 
dependent variable Prime Ministers’ responses to public opinion were analyzed and it 
was determined whether two-level game strategies were employed and on which level. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter eight different strategies have been listed on the 
national and international levels. Table 3.1 shows to what extent leaders are employing 
these strategies and table 3.2 illustrates how and for what reason they are using them. 
Each of the cells must be filled in with “Yes” when Prime Ministers are using the 
strategies or a “No” when they are not. 
 
Table 3.2: The two-level game strategies used by Prime Ministers 
Aznar Zapatero 
TWO-LEVEL GAME STRATEGIES Iraq EUC Iraq EUC 
Rally support from one’s constituency     
Ride unsupportive climate of opinion     
Convince the other side that his win-set is small     
Informed negotiators can exploit ignorance     
Use side payments to attract marginal supporters     
“Cutting slack” in the ratification process     
“Tying one’s hands” on the international level      
“Tying one’s hands” on the national level      
 
Table 3.3: Indicators of the reasons for using the two-level game 
REASON and INDICATOR MEANING of the INDICATOR 
Follow public opinion Policy making reflects the majority due to the fact that 
leaders act according to preferences of voters 
Make use of public opinion Leaders exploit and manipulate public opinion in order to 
achieve their party or personal goals 
Ignore public opinion Leaders refuse to take notice of public opinion and 
disregard it intentionally 
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the relation between the two-level game strategies and 
the reasons for using them.       
                    
 
Figure 3.2: Implications of playing the two-level game 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Implications of not playing the two-level game 
 To ascertain which of the strategies Aznar and Zapatero were using, a discourse 
analysis of the two-level language employed in negotiations on both, the national and 
the international level was carried out. According to Fairclough (2003: 124), discourse 
(also called discursive formation) is a “way of representing aspects of the world – the 
processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of 
thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world”. According to Bosold and 
Oppermann (2006: 2), “within a discursive environment, social agents such as 
governments in foreign policy are operating, shaping the world by their utterances and 
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the use of language”. For the purpose of my analysis governments are perceived as 
social agents that are involved in several discourses and ways of acting upon a world 
that is shared and contested.  
 The sources used are debates, statements, speeches, war plans, etc. in media and 
literature of the following politicians:  
1. Prime Minister José María Alfredo Aznar López (5th of May, 1996 to April 
17th, 2004) 
2. Minister of Foreign Affairs under José Maria Aznar, Josep Piqué Camps (2000-
2002) 
3. Minister of Foreign Affairs under José María Aznar, Ana Isabel de Palacio y 
del Valle Lersundi (Ana Palacios) (2002-2004) 
4. Minister of Defense under José María Aznar, Federico Trillo-Figueroa y 
Martínez-Conde (2000-2004) 
5. Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (17th of April, 2004 – 21st of 
December, 2011) 
6. Minister of Foreign Affairs under José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Miguel Angel 
Moratinos (2004-2010) 
7. Minister of Defense under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, José Bono Martínez 
(2004-2006) 
 For my research I have reviewed interviews, press conferences, declarations, 
articles and conferences in international organizations from September 2001 (after 
9/11) to February 2005 (European Constitution referendum) these were found in the 
online archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation of Spain, the Ministry 
of Defense and national and international newspapers. Among the sources reviewed: 
1. Prime Ministers’, Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ and Defense’s declarations.   
2. Prime Ministers’ press conferences held at the conclusion of each country’s 
official visits.  
a. Conference with George W. Bush (President of the United States)  
b. Conference with Tony Blair  (Prime Minister of Great Britain) 
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c. Conference with Jacques Chirac (President of France)  
d. Conference with Silvio Berlusconi (Prime Minister of Italy)  
e. Conference with José Manuel Durao Barroso (Prime Minister of 
Portugal)  
f. Conference with Gerhard Schröder (Prime Minister of Germany)  
g. Conference with Lesek Miller and Alexander Kwalasniewski (Prime 
Ministers of Poland) 
3. Press Conferences at International Organizations 
a. Press Conference at the European Council 
b. Press Conference at the European Commission 
c. Press Conference at the Council of Ministers 
d. Press Conference at NATO 
e. Press Conference with Kofi Anan and José Maria Aznar 
4. Minister of Foreign affairs’ conference with their counterpart 
a. Press Conference with Collin Powell and Ana Palacios 
b. Press Conference with Jack Straw and Ana Palacios 
5. Articles sent to newspapers 
6. Prime Ministers’ interviews in national newspapers 
a. El País 
b. ABC 
c. El Mundo 
d. Estrategia Global 
7. Prime Minister interviews in international newspapers 
a. El Diario de Venecia (Italy) 
b. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany) 
c. Wirtschafts Woche (Germany) 
d. Panorama (Mexico) 
e. Der Spiegel (Germany) 
f. The Wall Street Journal Europe 
g. Delo (Slovenia) 
h. Financial Times (UK) 
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3.3.4 Specific objectives 
 
 Describe and analyze in detail the two different foreign policies: 
How could the nature of the policy also be affecting the policy 
making and what is the determining factor? 
 
 In order to describe the two foreign policy decisions and to determine how the 
type of the policy can affect foreign policy making, I use Kjell Goldmann’s 
differentiations. As mentioned in chapter two, public involvement would vary 
according to the type of foreign policy and whether the policy complies with the 
theories of bargaining with outsiders, supreme interest and remoteness. Determining 
the validity of such theories in the cases of the Iraq invasion and then the removal of 
troops from Iraq and first the rejection of the EU constitution and then approval of the 
EU constitution helps us to find out if the policy is imperative for leaders and for their 
citizens. It also informs us to what extent the policy is open to domestic constituencies. 
The evidence establishing the “room for the citizenry” is based mainly in previous 
research and literature. A review of the Spanish legislation is useful to reveal the 
bargaining position of the leaders. On the other hand, leaders’ discourses are also 
helpful to discern where the policy is in the state’s supreme interest. By revealing 
where a policy is supreme, remote and impermeable to outsiders will shed light on 
what factors are most influential in policy making.  
 
Table 3.4: How to assess the three principles of the incompatibility hypothesis 
Principle Consequence How to assess the principle 
Bargaining 
Determine the room for the 
citizenry 
Have the foreign policy decisions been 
taken alone or together with other actor-
based factors? With which ones? 
Supreme interest 
If it is important for 
leaders and the Nation 
Are Prime Ministers concerned 
regarding the policy? 
Remoteness 
If it is important for 
citizens 
Is the public very concerned regarding 
the policy? 
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 To answer the questions for each of the principles in the table above, I have 
relied on a literature review for the first two principles and secondary sources for the 
third principle, particularly public opinion polls. Some of the survey questions 
regarding remoteness are: 
 In the Iraq case: Are you concerned with the conflict? 
 With regards to the European Constitution: Does the result of the 
referendum concern you? 
 The goal is to establish a relationship between leaders playing a 
two-level game and the democratic level of the policies 
 
 As mentioned, a policy is democratic to the extent that it complies with the 
three characteristics of representation, participation and information. By comparing 
two-level game strategies with the actions taken, it should be possible to determine if 
the policy making was democratic, seemed to be democratic or it was autocratic. 
 
 
Table 3.5: How to determine if a policy is democratic 
 
Follow public opinion 
 
Use public opinion 
 
 
Ignore public opinion 
 
 
Not necessary to play the-two 
level game on the national 
level, but can play on the 
international 
 
 
Play the two level game on 
either in national or 
international level 
 
Not necessary to play any of the 
two-level game strategies 
 
Democratic 
 
 
Seems to be democratic 
 
autocratic 
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3.4 Conclusion: measurement and source validity. 
 In its broadest definition, validity measures the integrity of conclusions that are 
drawn from research, including the degree to which findings can be generalized across 
social settings (Bryman, 2008: 32). Measurement validity refers to what extent an 
indicator really reflects the concept it is supposed to measure. Sources validity is 
whether the data analyzed is the most appropriate for measuring an indicator. The 
questions become do my indicators accurately represent the concepts they were 
supposed to measure? Is the data gathered the most suitable for measuring such 
indicators? I attempt to answer both questions in this research for each of the analyzed 
concepts. 
 
 The independent variable of public opinion: Three concepts are brought into 
question: constraint, empowerment and neutrality. The question is if the three 
concepts measure how public opinion may affect policy making. Even though is 
not possible to be completely concise and able to determine exactly to what 
extent public opinion can constrain or empower policy makers, it is possible to 
measure qualitatively whether public opinion is against, supports or is neutral 
towards policies. The sources collected from public opinion polls are sufficient 
and complete to characterize public opinion and determine the Spanish citizens’ 
attitudes towards various foreign policy decisions.  
 
 The dependent variable of policy making: The two variables that measure 
policy making are whether or not policy makers pay attention to public opinion. 
The indicators do not reflect a quantitative value, but only a qualitative one, 
therefore the measurements cannot be expected to represent a level of precision 
of a quantitative study. The sources and method utilized would have benefited 
from personal interviews with policy makers; however, the difficulty obtaining 
such interviews precluded the use of direct interviews. Instead I have obtained 
information from other sources to fill in the gaps.  
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 Specific objectives of the type of policy: The sources used could have possibly 
benefited from been more direct, however, the literature adequately describes 
the types of policies analyzed in this research. Moreover, the method used 
(Goldmann’s theory), is well suited to achieving the objective of this thesis. 
 
 Specific objectives of the democratic level of the policy:  This topic could have 
made an interesting thesis on its own. That being said making a correlation 
between the levels of democracy of a policy and two level games has enriched 
my thesis.  
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4 IRAQ INVASION 
4.1 Introduction  
 This chapter describes the Iraq War, the legacy of the war, the most relevant 
Security Council (SC) resolutions and the reasons given by the international 
community for the invasion. Secondly, it seeks to portray the public reaction towards 
the invasion in detail. At the same time it explains the nature of the opposition as well 
as the evolution of the Spanish shift towards opposition of the war. In the last section 
Aznar and Zapatero’s response to public opinion regarding their foreign policy 
objectives will be analyzed separately. To conclude, I discuss some of the differences 
between the PP and PSOE’s governments in relation to the management of the war in 
Iraq. 
4.2 Iraq Crisis and the Spanish contribution  
The attacks on September 11 carried out by Al Qaeda operatives, trained and led 
from their bases in Afghanistan, demonstrated the threat posed by terrorists who could 
seek safe haven in rogue nations (Yoo, 2003: 565). Iraq as a rogue state possibly 
holding weapons of mass destruction became an important issue, particularly for the 
United States as the target of the 9/11 attacks, but also for other nations that had 
terrorist activity within their borders, such as Spain.  
In September 2002 “Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as 
necessary to enforce existing SC resolutions
6
 and to eliminate the dangerous threat to 
                                                 
6
 On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which required Iraq to: (1) destroy 
its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and agree to onsite inspections; (2) not use, 
develop, construct, or acquire such WMD and their delivery systems; (3) not acquire or develop 
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or components; and (4) accept on-site inspection 
and destroy nuclear-related weapons or materials. To carry out the inspections, the resolution 
established a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Due to repeated refusal of Iraqi 
authorities to comply with the resolution the SC adopted Resolution 1137 which condemn [... the 
continued violations by Iraq of its obligations … (and) found that the situation continued to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security, and warned that "serious consequences" would result if 
Iraq failed to comply with its international obligations. In 1998 Iraq formally halted all cooperation 
with UNSCOM and therefore the SC (Res. 1205) condemned Iraq decision as a flagrant violation of 
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international peace and security” (Yoo, 2003: 563). The SC two month later on 
November 2002, responding to Bush’s declaration, adopted Resolution 1441, which 
found Iraq to be in “material breach of previous SC resolutions” and “warned that it 
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its 
obligations”: to comply with its disarmament. Despite the warning, Iraq refused to 
fully comply with the resolutions. Consequently the United States, with the “coalition 
of the willing”, invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003. 
The risk of allowing the Iraqi regime to defy the international community by 
possibly pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was the main reason presented 
by the US to attack Iraq preemptively (Taft & Buchwald, 2003: 563). In addition, two 
independent sources of law with authority to use force in Iraq were provided: UN SC 
resolutions and the right of self-defense (Yoo, 2003: 567).  
The most important resolutions coming out of the SC concerning Iraq were 
Resolution 678 (1991) and the aforementioned Resolution 1441 (2002). Pursuant to 
the former, the United States could use force to impose a cease-fire and to restore 
"international peace and security" to the region. In Resolution 1441, the SC 
unanimously found that Iraq, in addition to being in material breach of this and earlier 
resolutions, the possible development of WMD programs, its support for terrorism and 
the repression of the civilian population, presented a threat to international peace and 
security (Idem).  
Authority for the armed intervention in Iraq was also explained by the national 
right of self-defense, which according to the Article 51 of the UN Charter is inherent 
to any of its members if an armed attack occurs. So considering “the naked aggression 
by Iraq to its neighbors, its efforts to obtain WMD and its records of having such 
weapons” as a latent threat, Operation Iraqi Freedom was conducted legally under 
article 51 according to the US.  
Spain contributed significantly militarily, helping in part to defeat Saddam 
Hussein. However, Aznar’s government played a much more important role in 
                                                                                                                                                        
resolution 687... and other relevant resolutions. On December 16 United States and Britain bombed 
Iraq. 
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supporting and giving some legitimacy to the war, which could not be justified by the 
international law nor authorized by the SC according to many other European nations. 
In the beginning there were eight European countries that supported a US military 
intervention in Iraq: Britain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Portugal and 
Denmark. Some others Eastern European countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 
would later support the war.  
In a letter the eight European countries that supported the war and signed on 30 
January 2003, stated that “Europe and the US must stand together”, and expressed 
loyal support for the American policy. It was Jose Maria Aznar who took on the role 
of representative of the group of countries that defended the US viewpoint. This group 
additionally opposed the strategy proposed by France and Germany, which argued 
against the use of force and in favour of the SC’s management of the crisis (Barbé: 
390). France, Germany, Russia and China’s position stalled any new resolution 
authorizing the use of force in Iraq in the spring of 2003. Thus, the argument that SC 
resolution 678’s broad authorization to restore the peace in 1991 was somewhat muted 
(Yoo, 2003: 567), damaging a central argument for the legality of the war. 
According to Menon (2004: 634), France and Germany had a more pragmatic 
reason to oppose the US war against Iraq that being the French and German desire to 
“develop the European Security and Defense Policy7 (ESDP) and to present a more 
unified front to Washington as the ‘war on terror’ moved forward”. The European 
approval and contribution to the Iraq war could undermine the desired relationship the 
EU wanted to have with the United States.  
France pursued one single goal: “making Europe a multiplier of power for 
France” (Stark, 2006: 12) where the main objective was to build an autonomous and 
militarily powerful Europe. For Britain, (and Spain) the European project “needed to 
be built and run constructively with NATO (referring to the US), not as a project 
designed to compete with or to relegate the Alliance” (Menan, 2004: 654).   
                                                 
7
 After the Lisbon Treaty renamed as The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 
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In this regard, the build-up to the war in Iraq revealed historical divisions 
between the European states. Furthermore, what concerned the European countries 
were their personal and national ambitions. Indeed, the shift in Spanish foreign policy 
during Jose Maria Aznar’s government was aimed at fostering a privileged 
relationship with the US.  
Aznar’s desire was not only to fight against ETA internally but also to increase 
Spain’s power both internationally and within Europe. In order to accomplish both, the 
Spanish leader decided to prioritize relations with the US and break from the countries 
that were considered by the US Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld as the old 
Europe. The change of government as a result of general elections on March 14, 2004 
represented a transformation in the involvement of Spain in the Iraq conflict. The first 
relevant political decision made by the new government of José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero was, to order the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, which was 
successfully concluded on May 21, 2004. According to several authors, the March 11
th
 
train attacks in Madrid that killed hundreds of people, were a clearly and 
unquestionable catalysts in the change of government in Spain and the election of the 
Socialist Party.  
It would be difficult to characterize Spain as a clear example of public opinion 
forcing government action. However, in the following section I will analyze Spanish 
attitudes towards the war on Iraq as well as the effects that it had on the general 
elections of March 2004.  
4.3 Spanish Public Opinion on the Iraq War 
According to Juan Díez Nicolás, the Spanish public has been characterized as 
being neutral and pacifist (Díez, 1986: 13). Generally, “the Spanish have not been in 
favour of Spain participating in military interventions to resolve conflicts,” (Barbé and 
Mestres, 2006: 58). In 1986 Juan Diéz (1986: 16) stated that about three out of four 
Spanish felt that there was no value or ideal to justify a war, even in cases of necessity. 
However, since the democratic transition the Spanish public has progressively 
accepted a new international role and the increasing contribution to multinational 
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missions (Barbé and Mestres, 2006: 58). In spite of this evolution public opinion 
remains opposed to war, and Spanish citizens in November 2004 could be 
characterized as doves. However in some specific circumstances
8
, the public accepts 
interventions and believes they can be justified. This is very well illustrated by the 
criticism the Spanish government received for its decision to participate in the 2003 
U.S-led intervention in Iraq, in contrasted to the support for the use of military force in 
humanitarian missions in Iraq after the invasion (See figures 4.2 and 4.3).  
Public opinion rejected the attack on the initial terms, but could justify the 
intervention in Iraq if certain criteria were met: first, that it is for humanitarian reasons 
and second, that it is undertaken by non-military means. 
Spanish opposition to the war in Iraq has been strong and stable over time. The 
Spanish people’s general opinion was against a hypothetical invasion of Iraq. In 
November 2002, 61 percent of Spaniards were against a U.S invasion of Iraq, and 24 
percent mentioned that any US invasion should have the support of the US’s allies and 
the United Nations (Brie, November 2002). Only 2 percent supported a unilateral 
attack. According to another opinion poll conducted by Pulsómetro Cadena Ser, up to 
65 percent opposed a military strike against Iraq even if the war had been backed by 
the UN (Noya, 2003:3). 
                                                 
8
 The vast majority, two-thirds of Spanish people(66%) are "doves", that is, they believe that 
economic power is more important than the military and in any case reject the use of war. It is, by far, 
the highest percentage in Europe (the European average is 42%) and more than six times that of the 
United States (10%). • The "pragmatic", those who believe that economic power is more important 
than the military, but also that war is sometimes necessary, are also markedly less numerous in Spain 
than in other countries: 22% in Spain compared with 43% in Europe and 65% in the USA. • 
"isolationists", who believe that war is unnecessary but give priority to military power over 
economic, makeup 11%, somewhat higher than the European average (8%) • Finally, only 2% of 
"hawks "(who believe that military power is still the key and that war is justified),  compared to 
Europe (7%) and much less than in the U.S. (22%). Barómetro Del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE) 4ª 
oleada resultados de octubre-noviembre de2003. 
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Figure 4.1: Public opinion regarding a hypothetical American attack on Iraq 
Source: BRIE report from November 2002 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Do you strongly agree, somewhat, little or nothing with the military intervention 
Source: CIS opinion poll February 2003 
 
61 % 
24 % 
2 % 13 % 
The United States should not invade Iraq
The United States should invade Iraq with
the approval of the United Nations
The United States should invade Iraq even
without the UN approval
Do not know/ Do not answer
1 % 
4 % 
21 % 
70 % 
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Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Indiferent
Do not know
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Figure 4.3: Do you strongly agree, somewhat, little or nothing with the humanitarian 
intervention? 
Source: CIS opinion poll April 2003  
 
Comparing Spanish public opinion to other European countries and the United 
States, Spanish citizens are the most opposed to war (see figure 4.4). 13 percent of the 
Americans were in absolute opposition to an invasion of Iraq, in Europe the percentage 
doubled to 26 percent. The largest absolute opposition (33 percent) occurred in Italy 
and the lowest in the UK and the Netherlands (20 and 18 percent respectively). 
Regarding conditional support, that is an attack under UN mandate, 65 percent of 
Americans would have supported it while 60 percent of the Europeans would have 
done so. On the other hand, UK and the Netherlands had the highest percentage of 
conditional support (70 percent). Finally, we note that the lowest unconditional 
support in Europe occurred in France (6 percent), the highest in Germany (12 percent) 
while in the United Sates was double at 20 percent. Spaniards fall outside standard 
European public opinion with regards to tolerance of military action.  
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of support to a hypothetic American attack to Iraq 
Source: BRIE report from November 2002. 
It is interesting to note that Spanish public opinion is not more supportive of an 
attack against Iraq with or without a UN mandate. According to Mestres and Barbé it 
seems that there is no reason to assume that Spanish public opinion is more favorable 
to a concrete mission lead by a multilateral organization. Rather, the determining 
factor is the perceived degree of violence and danger where the mission takes place 
(2006: 59). Iraq was seen as very dangerous. José María Aznar made it clear to the 
newspapers when he mentioned that the mission with around 1,300 Spanish soldiers 
participating, was “very dangerous" and had "risks" (El Mundo, 23 of July 2003)  
The reluctance to use force, even with the approval of the international 
community, is expressed by the fact that Spanish people preferred Spain to be neutral 
(67 percent) in the conflict. Only 21 percent mentioned that Spain should support the 
Alliance. The massive demonstrations on February 15
th
 against a war in Iraq also 
revealed Spanish opposition to a war. 
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Figure 4.5: What should Spain do if there is a military intervention in Iraq? 
Source: CIS opinion poll February 2003 
When Spaniards were asked if the international community should intervene in 
the case of tyrannical and dangerous regimes, 24 percent opposed the attack (CIS 
opinion poll April 2003). Therefore it can be inferred that the public is less averse 
when there are “altruistic” reasons to justify the intervention. 61 percent agreed with 
the idea of Spain being a humanitarian troop contributor (Idem), however, only if it 
was within an UN-led multilateral force (BRIE report from November 2003-February 
2004). Very few believed that the troops should stay even if more countries were 
involved in the Coalition (8 percent in average) (see figure 4.6). Even fewer (7 percent 
on average) believed that the Spanish military should stay and continue as long as the 
US-led Coalition stayed. 
Public opinion indicates that even if a military evolvement was endorsed by the 
United Nations, the Spanish people would still massively reject the mission. But in the 
event that Iraq became a humanitarian intervention, the UN's approval was extremely 
important for public opinion. “Most people (53 percent) supported the UN resolution 
1511 and considered that it was a major advance for the reconstruction of Iraq” (BRIE 
Nov. 2003). 
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Figure 4.6: What do you think the military troops should do? 
Source: BRIE report from November 2003-Febrery 2004 
Based on the above analysis there seems to be a clear inconsistency: an 
intervention is justified in some cases, but an attack is rejected. The key to this 
apparent contradiction according to Noya could be based in the fear of the United 
States (2003: 1)
9
. However, according to the data analyzed in this paper, this 
contradiction could be better explained by a lack of humanitarian reasons when giving 
a justification to attack Iraq.  
The pacifism of the Spanish public, the support given to humanitarian 
intervention and the necessity of the UN's approval, are characteristics also seen in 
public reaction to Spain’s participation in NATO’s invasion of Yugoslavia. Spanish 
soldiers invaded the territory controlled by Slobodan Milosevic without the 
authorization of the SC. A majority (56 percent)
10
 of the Spanish considered that the 
military intervention in Yugoslavia should have had UN’s consent (El País, 18 of 
January 1999). However, for 57 percent of the respondents the intervention could be 
                                                 
9
 Even though a considerable 85 percent of Spanish public opinion mentioned that United States’ 
attitude against Iraq was regular, bad or very bad.  
10
 At the same time, seven out of ten Spanish, that is 69% of respondents, thought that the bombing of 
the allied forces should immediately cease (El Pais-05.06.1999). 
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justified by serious human rights violations by Milosevic's
11
 forces against Kosovo (El 
País, 05 of June 1999). 
In contrast to the War in Yugoslavia, the intervention of Iraq was explained 
either by economic or unfounded or vague rational, such as: the oil supply that would 
be extremely threatened, the fact that Iraq had developed nuclear weapons and/or 
weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq aided terrorism. The Spanish public found 
the risk to oil supply to be the least important reason to invade Iraq (37 percent). The 
possibility that Iraq was developing WMD was considered significant (19 percent said 
it was very important and 42 said it was important). The motive may perhaps be that 
the threat also could affect the interviewee. 
 
Figure 4.7: Justifications for a possible attack on Iraq 
Source: BRIE Report from February 2003. 
Considering the reasons to justify the invasion of Iraq, the UK, Italy, Germany 
and France, gave high importance to the fact that Iraq was possibly developing WMD 
(67, 49, 57, 54 percent respectively). In Spain on the other hand, percentages tend to 
be less than the half of Europe’s average (19 percent).  
                                                 
11
 83 percent believed that Milosevic should be tried for war crimes before the International Court in 
The Hague (El Pais-05.06.1999). 
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Figure 4.8: Importance of WMD to justify the invasion in Iraq by country 
Source: BRIE Report from February 2003 
Concerning 9/11 as a justification for the invasion, Spain was again far more 
reluctant to support war than its neighbors (18 percent said that was very important). 
Public opinion in the UK, France, Italy and Germany ranked the attacks in New York 
also as an important reason to justify the war (55, 47, 45 and 44 percent respectively). 
 
Figure 4.9: 9/11 to justify the invasion in Iraq by country 
Source: BRIE Report from February 2003 
Analyzing two of the justifications for the invasion of Iraq (19% WMD and 18% 
9/11), one cannot categorize the Spanish public as indifferent because the category 
"important" obtained 42 and 39 percent of respondents respectively. This means the 
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Spanish people could justify the attack on these terms, although not with the intensity 
of other nations as the conflict is considered an American problem.  
Despite the great public opposition to the invasion of Iraq, Aznar along with the 
rest of the “coalition of the willing” decided on March 20th of 2003 to invade. Because 
of this, the Spanish Government was viewed mostly negatively by the public a month 
after the invasion. What it is interesting is the increase in popularity of the 
government’s position towards the crisis from February to April 2003. While in 
February 11 percent perceived as very good or good (1,2 and 9,7) the way the 
government was carrying out the conflict, in April this percentage almost doubled to 
20 percent
12. (Figure 4.10) This may be explained by the fact that the war’s outcome 
seemed to be positive in the beginning. But as soon as the specter of returning body-
bags appeared, public opinion expressed a desire for Spain to limit its involvement in 
the conflict. On February 2004, almost a year after the initial invasion, the number of 
people who wanted the military troops to stay (as part of a UN multilateral force) 
decreased to 39 percent. 75 percent evaluated the government performance in Iraq as 
average, bad or very bad. 
 
Figure 4.10: How people assessed the position of the Spanish government in the Iraq crisis 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion polls of February and April 2003  
                                                 
12
 When the Spanish government invaded Iraq with the “coalition of the wiling”, the political situation 
was considered as one of the worst of Aznar’s administration See Figure 1 in the appendix 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
feb.03 apr.03
Very good
Good
Regular
Bad
Very bad
Do not know
Do not answer
 47 
The bombings in Madrid on 11
th
 of March (11-M), 2004 galvanized opposition to 
the permanence of the troops in Iraq. According to the results of the sixth BRIE survey 
(May 2004), 64 percent of the Spanish public believed that 11-M would have not 
occurred if Spain had not supported the US in the Iraq conflict, against 23 percent that 
though it would have happened in any case. According to Noya, Spain was the target 
of the terrorist attacks due to the fact that it was the weakest country of the Coalition 
(2004:3).  
Spain’s left mobilized against the PP government punishing Aznar for and 
making him seem directly responsible for the 11-M killings as the result of his support 
for the US in the war against Iraq (Idem). This could have contributed to the results of 
the post electoral CIS survey that showed that almost 30
13
 percent of the Spanish 
electorate claimed that the 11-M influenced their vote to some extent (22 percent were 
very much influenced or influenced, another 18 percent were mobilized to vote and 12 
percent changed their votes). 
Another survey by Gallup asked the same question, concluding that for 84 
percent of the Socialists (PSOE) voters, 91 percent of the Populars (PP) and 80 percent 
of the United Left (IU) the bombings did not influence them. The CIS survey from 
March 2004 noted that almost 10 percent of the Socialists voters elected Rodriguez 
Zapatero’s party PSOE due to 11-M and its consequences, while less than 1 percent of 
PP voters were influenced by these circumstances. The terrorist attacks in Madrid had 
repercussions in the voters’ decision to switch their votes from the party they had 
planned. In fact, 4,5 percent of the voters who voted for the Socialist party had not 
planned to do so before, the same is true of 10 percent of Popular Party’s voters (see 
figure 1 in the Appendix).   
The attack and deaths of 11-M caused the delegitimisation of the PP’s 
government and in the elections on March 14 (14-M), the voters chose Rodriguez 
Zapatero of the Socialist Party, who from the beginning, was opposed to the invasion 
of Iraq. The first decision made by the new PSOE’s government was to withdraw the 
                                                 
13
 In April 2003 when Spanish citizens were asked if the Iraq War could change their votes in the upcoming local 
and regional election in May 2003, 19 per cent answer yes, that is 10 percent fewer than after the 11-M. 
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Spanish troops from Iraq. Public opinion was very favorable to this decision and only 
10 percent of people were against it.  
Since the beginning of the war in Iraq, political ideology emerged as the most 
significant variable in analyzing the differences in public opinion. The leftists were the 
most openly opposed to the attack 76 percent of the PSOE’s voters were in absolute 
opposition to attack Iraq in November of 2002, while 42 percent of PP’s supporters 
were against it. 21 percent of leftist agreed with a conditional support versus 37 
percent of the rightists supported a UN led intervention.  
The “most striking aspect is that there is no difference between those who are 
more or less informed” 14 (BRIE February 2003). It was not a matter of knowledge but 
of ideology. Even though the right was more inclined to support the war, in general 
Spanish public opinion is still pacifistic and rejects the use of force.  
A very important aspect to highlight is the fact that Zapatero adopted the same 
ideological position as the Spanish constituency. 
4.4 Phase 1: Aznar “shooting ” in Iraq to become 
the “Great Spain” 
 The transition to democracy after General Franco’s death was characterized by 
a traditional, almost blind, pro-European stance, based on consensual politics. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish policy guidelines were altered by PP’s main figure José 
María Aznar, who was the driving force behind sweeping policy shifts, both at home 
and abroad. During his second administration Aznar forged strong ties with the US, 
leaving Spain more deeply divided than at any time since dictatorship (Woodworth, 
2004: 8). This was most evident in Aznar’s decision to take Spain into the war against 
Iraq despite strong opposition that wanted European states to find a solution together.  
                                                 
14
  31 percent of the Spanish population followed the news about the conflict with great interest, while 46, 6 
followed it somewhat closely and 19 percent followed it less closely. Therefore, it can be inferred that almost 
everyone was very or somewhat informed about the conflict and thus interested or concerned about the events. In 
fact, 29 percent said to be very concerned and 53,7 percent somewhat worried.  
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 Even though it might be conceivable that Aznar’s foreign policy was influenced 
by the attacks on 9/11, his desire to forge a close alliance with the US predated the 
attacks of September 11th. This was particularly noticeable in both the fight against 
the Basque terrorism group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the role that he 
considered the European Union should play in international relations, with Spain 
“visible” in the forefront of its international presence.  
 Europe was extremely important for Aznar’s foreign policy objectives of 
defending liberty, democracy and fighting against nationalist exclusion, ethnic tyranny 
and terrorism (Aznar, 2000). In Aznar’s point of view however, Europe needed 
organizations and allies on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly from the United 
States
15
 (Idem). At the Azores meeting (March 16, 2003) he expressed the importance 
of this transatlantic link: “the solidarity between Europe and the U.S. has always been, 
is, and should continue to be, a great European commitment; and today's Europe could 
not be understood without that commitment” (The Guardian, 16 of March 2003). In 
January 2003, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ana Palacios, made a noteworthy 
statement: “Europe needs the U.S. in the same extent that the U.S. needs us” (El País, 
17 of February 2003). 
The Basque problem, conflated with terrorism, had lasted many years in Spain; 
therefore, according to Aznar it was time to solve the problem. In this it was he who 
had to convince Bush that the US should support Spain and that it was necessary to 
coordinate international action against all types of terror, against nationalist groups 
like ETA and against international ones like the Islamists (Ekaizer cited in 
Woodworth, 2004: 13). In May 2001 both the United States and Spain signed a joint 
declaration to fight against terrorism together. Even though Spanish Prime Minister 
found the US to be somewhat disengaged, Bush fully committed to Aznar’s point of 
view after the attacks on the Twin Towers(Woodworth, 2004). 
On September 11
th
 Prime Minister Aznar (2001a) made a remarkable declaration:  
                                                 
15
 In the Conference of the Prime Minister, José María Aznar, at Johns Hopkins a month after the Invasion in 
Iraq he mentioned that after the events of terrorism the cooperation between Washington  with the European 
Union should strengthen and deepen.  
 50 
“ETA and bin Laden are the same (…) no distinction should be made between 
terrorists”. Based on this statement it seems that Aznar felt that the attacks in 
New York directly affected his county, It seems that for Aznar the fight against 
ETA was reason enough to justify Spanish involvement in the Iraq War” 
(Ordeix, 2005: 610).  
In an article published in the Financial Times, Aznar said  
The Spanish people cannot be neutral bystanders when confronted with the 
consequences of an act of terrorism. Not only because of the scale of the attacks, 
or by the fact that they were especially heinous. But because our own 
experience, the frequency and intensity with which we have experienced death 
and destruction caused by terrorism, makes us also feel victims and to share the 
pain of those who suffered directly” ((Financial Times 21 of September 2001).   
The day after the attacks, Aznar (2001b) gave the US unconditional support 
expressing his commitment to fight terrorism, being the second, after Tony Blair, in 
his pledging of unequivocal support for whatever response the Bush administration 
thought appropriate (Woodworth, 2004: 12). This position finally propelled Aznar to 
be up front with the larger powers as he always wanted to be. The famous picture in 
Azores of Aznar with Bush and Blair captured this moment.  
The main argument expressed by Aznar to justify the Spanish involvement in the 
Iraq war was:  
 The threat posed by Saddam and the use of chemical or biological weapons by 
terrorist groups encouraged by the dictator". In any of his declarations, PP’s 
Prime Minister referred to humanitarian reasons to invade. On the other hand, 
he didn’t take into consideration Spanish public opinion, given that in his view, 
credible leaders “cannot be influenced by the flow of public opinion”16 (Le 
Monde 8 of March 2004).  
Instead, added Palacios (Izvestia 20 of February 2003), “government policies should 
be solely designed based on the responsibility the leaders have taken (internationally) 
and never on public opinion polls”. 
                                                 
16
 During the Interview with the French Newspaper Le Monde, Aznar was asked how was it possible 
that he could take decision alone even though the great majority was against of getting Spain into the 
War. Then he answered that “to run a country, there are two prerequisites: decisiveness and 
conviction. Leaders cannot be swayed by every wind or float like a cork drifting with the tide. Those 
who are carried away by wind or tide, they cannot be called leaders but vane. I for each decision, each 
reform taken by my government, I have never been swayed by the wind of time. I have always been at 
the forefront. 
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Even though Aznar indicated the danger that terrorist groups embodied, he was 
unable to effectively justify the Iraq War in the public’s eyes. Hence, people did not 
understand the motives to participate in a war that was not theirs. In fact, Minister 
Palacios mentioned it to the Slovenian newspaper “Delo”: “I have the impression that 
not everyone understood well enough why the government adopted the position taken” 
(Delo, 3 of September 2003). 
Aznar on the other hand, (ABC, 16 of February 2003) said that he “attempted, as 
far as he could, to explain to the Spanish people the Government's view”. Despite 
these good intentions, the Prime Minister also assumed that the government knew 
what was best for Spain and the world. In his own words: “Believe me when I say that 
I will continue to explain the people that the Government's position is, exactly, the one 
we should keep: the best for their safety, the best for peace” (ABC, 16 of February 
2003).  
The drive to go to war in Spain was not one party’s fight, but one man’s fight. 
The President, at that time Prime Minister designate, Mariano Rajoy said so on the day 
of elections in 2004: “Aznar, you and your war”17 This indicates that more than the 
party being punished, the “Aznar factor” weighted the most on the elections of March 
2004. 
4.5 Phase 2: Zapatero-“booting out” the war of Iraq 
and strengthening the European Union  
The dozen bombs that ripped through three Madrid commuter trains and which 
killed almost 200 people and injured more than a thousand, destroyed PP’s elections 
chances. The government of Aznar built the election around its campaign against 
Basque terrorism, and there were signs that public opinion was with them (Torcal & 
Rico, 2004: 114). Therefore, if the attack had been the work of ETA, the PP would 
probably have been elected. However, since it was proven that the attack was the work 
of an Islamic group, and that the government was manipulating the news erroneously 
                                                 
17
 (Woodworth, 2004: 7). A senior member of the Spanish judiciary and an astute observer of the Spanish affairs 
assured Woodworth that what Rajoy said to Aznar was true.  
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blaming the Basques, the electorate punished the Popular Party electing José Luis 
Zapatero of the center-left party.  In what was seen as a surprise result, the PSOE 
gained a five point victory over the PP.  
Prior to taking up office, Zapatero had announced that Spanish troops would be 
withdrawn from Iraq and that he would take: 
Spain out of that photography in the Azores” (El País, 15 of April 2004). Even 
though he mentioned he would wait for the UN to pass a resolution modifying 
the legal status of foreign troops in Iraq, on the 18
th
 April “Zapatero decided to 
remove the troop immediately, without waiting for the adoption of the UN SC 
resolution 1546 on 8 of June 2004, which was construed by some as having 
provided the invading troops with a modicum of legal cover, (Powell, 
2011:146; Zapatero, 2004a). 
Zapatero’s decision could be explained on two fronts: first, because Spanish 
public opinion supported the withdrawal, and second, because he wanted to recover the 
traditional foreign policy of Spain as a country linked to France and Germany. In fact, 
Spanish Prime Minister wasted no time in visiting Paris and Berlin in April 2004. 
Meeting them again in September in Madrid, the three leaders provided their host this 
time with an opportunity to snub US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by 
proclaiming that old Europe was as good as ever (Powell, 2011:149). 
It has been largely noted that Aznar’s government appears to have paid more for 
misleading the public than for its policy on Iraq
18
. However, despite the fact that the 
attacks mobilized 1,700,000 voters who had not planned to vote and discouraged 
another 300,000 voters from voting (Michavila, 2005: 31), a significant segment was 
no longer willing to support Aznar’s war policy.  
For one reason or another, according to Zapatero, following public opinion was 
the most relevant factor in ordering the troops home. José Bono, PSOE’s Defense 
Minister in an interview stressed this urgency claiming that “Spain should not wait 
from a resolution to come (from the UNSC), given that the president on the one hand 
made a commitment to the Spanish people; while the United Nations on the other, will 
                                                 
18
 See for example: Javier Jordán and Robert Wesley, “The Madrid Attacks: results of investigations 
two years later,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 5 (March 9, 2006), pp. 1–4.   Michavila, Narciso, 
“War, Terror and Elections: electoral impact of the Islamist terror attacks on Madrid,” Public Opinion 
Working Paper, No. 13 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano April 6, 2005), 
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never take charge of the situation in Iraq” (El País, 21 of April 2004). Furthermore, 
Zapatero told a local newspaper that withdrawing the troops from Iraq was a result of 
the will of the electorate, reflected by 75-80% of the Spanish voting public. In a 
democratic country, he added, it is important to respond to the aspirations of the 
majority, the general feeling of the public and the society (Time, 27 of September 
2004). 
Overall, the relationship between the government and the public opinion at least 
during the first year of Zapatero’s mandate was close. The government, encouraged 
not only by democratic convictions but also by the fear of the harshness of public 
opinion after 14-M.  The government was unable either to act against the will of the 
Spanish citizens nor to conspire behind their backs. Zapatero therefore had to respect 
the promises of his campaign, which was the withdrawal of troops from Iraq.  
It is important to mention that while the public was not in favour of Spain 
participating in military interventions to resolve conflicts, the government limited their 
international involvement to peacekeeping and peace building operations. Spain 
indeed, became a significant supporter of the development of the Security and Defense 
Policy in the EU (ESDP). Under Zapatero the Spanish military contributed in nine 
different interventions, all of them localized in three different continents where the 
ESDP intervened. As a final point, the famous quote from the Spanish philosopher 
Ortega y Gasset –“Spain as the problem and Europe as the solution- perfectly 
summarizes the Spanish position on the European construction and also on the Spanish 
participation in the ESDP” (Barbe & Mestres, 2007: 50). 
4.6 Conclusion 
The differences between the Governments of Aznar and Zapatero regarding 
their foreign policies towards Iraq and their relation with public opinion are vast. The 
“style” of the PP government was characterized by its tendency to ignore public 
opinion, its lack of transparency, and a systematic scorn for opponents. On the other 
hand the way Zapatero approached public opinion was characterized by both 
obedience and compromise. Aznar always pursued one single goal: “making Iraq a 
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multiplier of power for Spain”. Active cooperation in the War, in NATO and with the 
United States occurred therefore, just in order to “reinforce the national grandeur and 
its role in world politics”. For Zapatero on the contrary, multilateralism was the best 
manner to act in those places where the use of force was required. In fact, despite the 
pacifist nature of the Spanish public, the importance given to humanitarian 
interventions by the government was enormous. The main reason for doing it, even 
though Zapatero also sought for a greater international projection, was that the 
influence abroad might be transformed into internal prestige.  
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5 THE EU CONSTITUTION 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses the 
historical background of the constitution, briefly in Europe, and with more detail with 
regards to Spain.  The second section explores Spanish public opinion towards the 
constitution in both political phases. The final section examines the characteristics of 
the domestic policy making.  This includes the various actors that were involved in the 
formation of the Spanish policy during both administrations, as well as the arguments 
and issues of contention regarding the various positions taken by Aznar and Zapatero. 
Their positions will be divided into two main parts: the constitutional negotiations 
between the drafting of the European Union in December 2001 and December 2003 
when Jose Maria Aznar rejected the Draft Constitution; and the negotiations between 
March 2004 when José Luis Zapatero was elected and February 2005 when the 
constitution was ratified via referendum. 
5.2 The European Constitution 
The Laeken Declaration of December 2001 started the Convention on the 
Future of the European Union and was the first step towards a European Constitution. 
“The Convention was provided with an open mandate to review the key reform issues 
arising for the EU’s future development” (Koning et al., 2006: 24). The results of the 
Convention chaired by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, were a draft Constitution for the EU. 
The main idea behind the European Constitution was to bring European institutions 
closer to their citizens.  
According to Tesebelis the majority of governments praised the final text as a 
good compromise, however, even though their delegates had participated in the 
drafting of the constitutional text, some member states immediately called the proposal 
of the Convention into question (Koning et al., 2006:25). 
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“Faced with a possible loss of decision-making power within the Union, Spain 
and Poland used their power of veto during the Brussels meetings of December 2003 
against the apparent absolute power of Germany and France, thereby halting the 
approval of the text,” (Chanona, 2004: 2). Both countries rejected the Draft Treaty due 
to the fact that the decision method of double majority advanced in the constitution 
would reduce Spain and Poland’s “weight” in European decision making and the 
budget process.  
In spite of this initial failure, the Constitution was renegotiated in an 
Intergovernmental Conference undergoing some small modifications in a period of six 
months. But despite the changes, the delay seriously affected the process of 
ratification. The Draft was approved on 17
th
 and 18
th
 of June 2004 by the European 
Council in Brussels, then signed on 29
th
 of October 2004 by representatives of the then 
25 member states of the European Union and ratified by the European Parliament on 
12
th
 of January 2005. There were 500 votes in favor of the constitution, 137 against 
with 40 abstentions (Aldecoa, 2006: 12). Later, the Treaty was ratified by 18 member 
states, which included referendums in some countries such as Spain, Netherland and 
France. However, the rejection by French and Dutch voters in May and June 2005 
respectively, brought the ratification process to a standstill. 
The ratification procedure in Spain “was implemented through a nonbinding 
referendum followed by parliamentary ratification by an absolute majority of the 
members of the Spanish Parliament” (Torreblanca & Sorroza; 2005; 1). The 
democratic consultation was carried out on February 20, 2005 and on April 2005, in 
accordance with article 93 of the Spanish Constitution. The Spanish Parliament ratified 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe by 337 votes in favor, 19 against 
with no abstentions (Torreblanca & Sorroza; 2006: 1).  
 The main national parties (PSOE and PP) voted in favour, along with the 
centre-right Basque, Catalan and Canary Island Nationalists (PNV, CIU and 
CCD). The left-wing nationalist parties in Catalonia (ERC), Galicia (BNG), the 
Basque Country (EAS and NA-BAI) and the nation-wide left-wing coalition 
(IU-ICV) voted against (Idem).  
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In the senate the Treaty was also approved by a wide majority (225 in favour, 6 against 
and 1 abstention) (Idem). Finally the European Constitution was ratified in Parliament 
on May the 20
th
 of 2005.  
There was no required turn out for the vote to ratify the Referendum. Under the 
electoral rules in Spain, the government could not campaign for any position, not even 
encouraging citizens to participate in the process (Torreblanca et al., 2005: 5). Despite 
this, the government of Zapatero warned the public about the risks of rejecting the 
constitution for the future of Spain in the European Union.  
During the Presidency of Aznar the approval of the constitution was presented  
in unattractive terms since it “would relegate Spain from the "grown-ups' table" to the 
"children's table, where no decisions are taken” (Woodworth, 2004: 24), lessening 
Spain’s power in blocking coalitions. In the draft approved by Zapatero the reduction 
of power was bigger for Spain. How could this be explained? Which preferences or 
factors are important in explaining the change of position? Who prevailed: public 
opinion, personal ambitions or political parties?  
5.3 Spanish Public Opinion toward a European 
Constitution 
Since the proposal of the constitution in 2003, until it was approved by a 
referendum in February 2005, questions were raised concerning public opinion 
towards the European Constitution. The result of the opinion polls, before and after the 
referendum, underlines principally two facts. First, there was general support towards 
the European integration process, and the Constitution is part of this process, reflected 
by the 77 and 73 percent of voters that backed these processes. Second, there was little 
interest and/or knowledge about the Constitution.  
In general, Spain supports of many of the European initiatives, and the 
Constitution had not been an exception. The fundamental reason to agree with the text 
was the fact that they considered it essential to continue European integration. The 
creation of a European citizenship was, to a lesser extent, also one of the main reason 
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that led Spaniards to vote for the Constitution in the referendum (Figure 4.1). 20 
percent of people answered that is was very important, 48 percent important and 10 
percent somewhat important (CIS opinion poll October and December 2004 and 
January 2005). 
 
Figure 5.1: Reasons given to vote in the referendum in Spain 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion poll (February-March). 
Since the Laeken conference, where the preparation of the draft began, more 
than half of the population considered the constitution positive and necessary for 
Europe. In autumn of 2004 (Eurobarometer opinion poll), 72 percent thought the 
European Union should have a constitution, putting Spain among the most supportive 
countries. Half a year before in the spring of 2004, Spain occupied the fourth place, 
after Italy, Luxemburg and Belgium, as the countries with highest level of support. In 
general, Spain has also ranked above the EU average (Figure 4.2.) in support for the 
constitution. 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison between Spain and European Union’s public opinion towards the EU 
Constitution  
 Source: Compilation based on Eurobarometer opinion poll 
Considering regionalism, even though with less strength, the constitution was 
also supported, in the Basque Country 62,6 percent agreed with the Constitution, while 
64,6 percent in Cataluña and 65,3 percent in Navarra voted yes (Ministry of Interior of 
Spain). These three autonomous regions had the highest percentages of no votes. 
Madrid (76, 5) and the Canary Islands (76) had the highest percentages of yes votes 
(Del Campo and Camacho, 2003: 93). The main reason explaining these results is that 
the European Commission, despite a heated debate in Parliament to give greater 
attention to the autonomous regions of Europe in the Constitution, decided to maintain 
the status quo; assuming a state-centric doctrine (Morata & Ramon, 2005). At the 
same time, it was not clear what practical effects the constitution would have had on 
the cultural and linguistic diversity of the different regions within the union (Sampedro 
et al., 2005). Spanish newspapers, ABC and El País depicted these claims: Ibarretxe
19
 
thinks it is "unacceptable" that the European Constitution "does not recognize the 
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 Juan Jose Ibarretxe Markuartu  is a Spanish politician of Basque nationalist origin. He belongs to the 
Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV). He is recognized because of The Plan Ibarretxe which proposed 
a new statute of autonomy, based on three pillars: The Basque people of Europe are a people with their 
own identity, the right of the Basque people to decide their future,  the right to self-determination, the 
decisions of the citizens of each region of the Basque Country (Basque Country, Navarra and Basque 
Country or Northern Basque Country, Basque Country see) must be respected by others and the other 
peoples of Europe. 
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oldest language in Europe, the Basque, and the other languages of the Pyrenees" 
(ABC, 18 of September 2004). Catalan nationalists disliked the role reserved for the 
regions in the draft of the Constitution (El País, 10 of June 2003). 
In 2002 Spanish public opinion ranked the creation of a European Constitution 
in sixth place after the necessity of assisting the fight against terrorism (ETA), the 
establishment of a Euro-order, a European legislature, a Judicial System and the 
homogenization of the education system (Diéz, 2006:142). Therefore, the European 
Constitution was not considered as one of Spain’s principal aspirations. The low 
attention reflected both in the elections as well as in knowledge of the constitution, 
illustrates that it was not considered a priority. 
On the 20
th
 of February 2005, Spain held a referendum. The turnout was 
relatively low, being the constitution referendum with the lowest participation 
compared with the referendum of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (67%) and the 
membership of NATO (60%). Only 42,3 percent of the population voted, even though 
during November 2004 and April 2005 more than 60 percent of the citizens were fairly 
sure about going to the polls (between 15 and 25 percent were possibly going to vote) 
(see table 2.1.). The polling results of January 2005, a month before the referendum, 
were not substantially different. Only about 30 percent were not very likely to vote or 
did not want to vote. When asking if the referendum of the Constitution were held 
tomorrow 16,4 percent would have abstained from voting. In February 2005, this 
percentage increased around 26 points (see table 2.2.). Despite that the vast majority of 
people were in agreement with having a referendum for the constitution many 
undecided voters chose to stay home. In November 2004 only 4 percent were against it 
while 83 percent were in favour.  
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Table 5.1: Spanish people that think they would vote in the referendum of the European 
Constitution 
 
Oct.04 Nov.04 Apr. 05 Jan.05 
Yes, sure 43,1 62,7 60,1 46,3 
Yes, maybe 26,7 16,2 15,3 22 
Do not know 14,8 13,5 13 14,5 
Probably, no 6,8 3,1 4,3 7,3 
No, sure 8,5 4,3 6,9 9,6 
Did not answer 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion poll (October, November 2004 and April January 
2005). 
 
Table 5.2: Spanish people that thinks he/she would vote if the referendum on the European 
Constitution would be held tomorrow 
 
feb.03 dic.04 nov.04 jan.05 
In favor 44,6 42,7 41,6 51,2 
Against 4 4,1 6 5,7 
Blank 5,2 6,9 5,1 4,6 
Abstention 13,6 22,6 9,7 16,4 
Do not know 30,4 22,5 35,6 20,9 
Did not answer 2,2 1,2 2 1,2 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion poll (February 2003, December -November 2004 
and January 2005). 
When they were asked if the results of the referendum concerned them, few 
answered that they did not care at all. These facts point out a big gap between words 
and actions as well as the low level of motivation the government and political parties 
managed to illicit from their supporters. 
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Figure 5.3: Does the result of the referendum concerns you? 
Compilation based on CIS opinion polls from October 2004, December 2004 and January 
2005 
The low level of participation was coupled with a lack of knowledge of the 
details and the process of creation of the Constitution. In 2002, when the Convention 
was preparing a Constitution for the European Union, on average, only 8 percent of 
respondents knew and followed the work of the Convention and 63 percent did not 
know anything (CIS opinion poll from July 2003 and April 2004). However, three 
month later (CIS opinion poll from July 2004) when the final text was approved, these 
percentages were reversed and 62 percent of the public knew about the European 
Constitution. Nevertheless, they did not know much about the content of the text itself. 
When asked about their level of knowledge of the essence of the Constitution, most 
people had a low, very low or no knowledge of the constitution’s contents. Those who 
reported a high level of understanding of the constitution were only around 9 percent. 
 
Figure 5.4: Level of Knowledge of the EU Constitution 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion poll (from July 2004 to February-March 2005). 
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Published in “El País” on December 11, 2004: “The Spanish support the 
Constitution, but they barely know it”. Another report from the same newspaper said 
that “89 percent admit to be unaware of the European Constitution, but 75 percent are 
sure that they will vote” (El País, 30 of December 2004). 
The fact that there was a huge level of abstention and ignorance towards the 
European Constitution could be explained by two reasons mainly: the lack of interest 
and the lack of information; considered both outcomes as the results of a government 
and political parties that did not try to elaborate about the text (see figure 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.5: Level of Knowledge of the EU Constitution 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion poll (from July 2004 to February-March 2005) 
The Real Instituto Elcano conducted a research analyzing the coverage that the 
Constitution had in the Spanish media and concluded that there was no effort to 
educate the population from either the government or the political parties. On the 
contrary, the treatment of the information was very elitist
20
 (Sampedro, Ruiz, Carrico, 
2005). According to the research, at least two factors reflected this, first, the inter-
institutional dependency of the Spanish media to partisan alignments that is for or 
against the government and second, the informants played a role in securing the flow 
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 The research analysed the three main Spanish newspapers: El País, El Mundo and ABC, 
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of information as prescribed and approved by official sources. For this reason, the 
debate on the European constitution did not appeal to the average citizen’s everyday 
concerns (Idem). 
Knowledge about the Constitution was not better among people with higher 
education: 16 percent of educated people assumed to be knowledgeable about the 
Constitution while 10 percent with low education were (BRIE 2004). 
Regarding the political parties, 44 percent (CIS; January 2005) said they 
ignored the opinion of the party they supported in the last elections. Although 
supporters of Catalonia Party (ERC) had a greater degree of knowledge (55 percent), 
the adherents from the other parties are not very far from this percentage. 
 
Figure 5.6: Percentage of voters who acknowledges their party's position on the issue of the 
European Constitution. 
Source: BRIE Report, December 2004 
In general, those who knew the position of their party shared it (see figure 5.7). 
This occurred in 80% of the cases. The PSOE got the most support from their voters 
with 87 percent and Convergence and Union from Catalonia (CIU) got the least with 
64 percent. The PP received less support than PSOE, which obtained 74 percent. 
PSOE and PP obtained from their bases greater legitimacy than the rest of the parties. 
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of voters that shares the position of the party they support 
Source: BRIE Report, December 2004 
Even though most voters shared the vision with their party, the support was not 
completely loyal. If the political party which they identified with would have asked 
them to vote for the Constitution, 42 percent would have done it. On the contrary, if 
they had asked to vote against it, 63 percent would not have followed their indications. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: If the Political Party which you 
feel more identified with ask you to vote for 
the Constitution, would you follow their 
indications? 
 
 
Figure 5.9: If they ask you to vote against 
the European constitution, would you 
continue to follow their indication?
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion poll. 
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The general support for the Constitution combined with a low interest, 
participation and knowledge of the Text denotes a passive acceptance rather than an 
active involvement of the Spanish citizens.  
5.4 Aznar: blocking the Negotiations and bringing 
Nice back 
The PP´s rejection of the EU Draft due to a new criterion of the voting system 
in the Council of Minister resulted in a debacle at the Rome Intergovernmental 
Conference in December 2003. The Nice Treaty´s voting system was meant to 
improve decision rules for the enlargement of the European Union and to give every 
member state the same power. The degressive proportionality system meant that small 
and medium-sized countries were over-represented in relation to their population 
under qualified majority votes (QMV)
21
, while larger countries were somewhat under-
represented (Moberg, 2002: 262). Spain was slightly over-represented and becoming a 
significant EU player as much as states like France and Germany. The new voting 
system proposed by European Constitution would have changed this to and granted 
France and Germany the power to potentially block Council proposals (See graphic 
below).  
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 The vote threshold was set in Nice is to 74% (255 of 345 votes). Moreover, a simple majority of 
member states (14 members in EU-27) and countries representing 62% of the EU population were 
required for the acceptance of a proposal. 
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Figure 5.10: Power Index to Form a Majority in the Council of Ministers 
(Source: Chari et al., 2004; 5) 
With the Nice Treaty, Spain had almost the same blocking power that the larger 
countries had, making it the fifth biggest power in the EU-27. The new rules could 
have officially codified the dominance of member states with larger populations like, 
Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. The key explanation is that population 
counts more under the Constitutional Treaty and a winning coalition must represent at 
least 55% of the EU members and 65% of the EU population (Kauppi, 2007: 700). In 
addition, the minimum number of countries to block a proposal was four and the 
abstentions were not counted (Algaba, Bilbao, Fernández, 2007: 1753). 
The objective of Spain’s rejection of the Constitution was obviously to protect 
its power within an enlarging EU (Moberg, 2002: 266). Since Spain had a substantial 
difference in population compared with the four largest EU countries, its privileged 
position would be removed if the Constitutional Draft came into force. PP’s reluctance 
to approve the Constitutional rules steamed from this possibility. The above analysis 
should be considered however within the context that: Aznar aspired to make Spain a 
great Power and one of the most significant players in the integrated European Union.  
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Carlos Closa (2004) has argued that the PP established over the last four years 
of governance (2000-2004) a new ‘paradigm’ for Spanish foreign policy where the 
traditional, almost blind, pro-European stance was altered. First, the party sought to 
make Spain ‘more visible’ at the international level by forging ties with the US. 
Secondly, the PP wished to make Spain ‘more respected’ at the EU level. In doing so it 
“was only interested in pursuing EU policy options that would ‘strengthen’ the 
Spanish position vis-à-vis other European superpowers such as Germany and France” 
(Chari et al., 2004: 12). The Constitutional Text however would call into question 
these assumptions since a victorious Franco-German axis would have distanced itself 
from US policy.  
Aznar’s thinking was rooted in the conviction that Spain was one of the greatest 
nations in Europe’s history (Closa, 2011: 126), so his sense of duty was in his own 
words “not only to be in Europe, but to participate, to decide and take responsibility” 
(Aznar, September 16, 2000). Both aphorisms: “We are a big” and “we are going to be 
a giant in the enlarged Europe” (Aznar cited in Marin 2003: 111) were set as PP´s the 
main goal, and the best way to achieved them, according to Josep Piqué, was to 
reverse the traditionally close alliance with France and Germany (Closa, 2011: 126). It 
is in this respect that Minister Piqué (2001) in one of his articles mentioned: “Spain 
has no doubt that Europe is built by all. Not just two”. Aznar (2000) in a similar vein 
reflecting his antagonism towards the dominance of France and Germany mentioned 
that “Spain and not just France have a special responsibility in Europe”. 
The aforementioned coincided with the new strengthening of bilateral relations 
with Britain and especially with the United States. According to Closa (2011: 126), 
Aznar’s favoritism towards UK and the U.S. was mainly extended to socioeconomic 
models. In Aznar’s (2000a) own words “Europe was fool if loses its competitive 
conditions, notably with the United States”, “it is extremely necessary for us to 
advance towards a Europe that is needed in our relationship with the U.S.” (Aznar 
2000b) 
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As it is possible to envision, Aznar perceived international politics as a 
competition, whose outcomes depended exclusively on the strength of each player 
(Closa, 2011: 126). His negotiation style reflected these beliefs while he adopted a 
tough and intransigent attitude, where the veto was the main negotiating tool (Idem). 
Aznar at both the Convention and the Conference tried to impose Spain’s interests, and 
earning the title of the ugly European given by the German Press (Die Woche, 22 of 
March, 2001).      
Woodworth also highlights (2004; 8) that Aznar “believed that those who were 
not with him were against him and came close to saying that those who were against 
him could not be democrats”. This “democratic fundamentalism” (Cebrián, 2004) it is 
also found in the way he dealt with the Spanish people. First, he was reluctant to 
include regionalism in the Constitutional debate, but he included Christianity. Second, 
in almost every speech, interview he gave, article or book he wrote, there was little to 
no reference to the public.  In the Conference held in Rome however, Aznar (2003a) 
said:  
“as I have argued many times when speaking of the European Council, if 
someone has a direct democratic legitimacy are those who sit on the European 
Council, the ones who represent our citizens. I also said that the ones who will 
be submitted to elections or to a European referendum will be us, (…) will be 
us in Spain”.   
Aznar refused to consider including regional languages in a debate of the 
Constitutional Text. For him, Spain had only one language that is Castellano 
(Spanish). In the Press Conference (2003a) when Aznar was asked about a possible 
inclusion of minority languages, he actually said: “Spain has a common language 
which is the official language of all: Spanish”. 
Aznar policy style, coordination, and decision making strategy regarding the 
European Constitution during his second administration could be characterized as the 
following: first the President exploited democracy as a function of his own power 
(Cebrián, 2004). Second he instrumentalized the Constitution to achieve more power 
in Europe and to turn Spain into a big power that would be able to compete with the 
US. Third to do so, his strategy was to walk away from the traditional alliance with the 
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Franco-German axis and to come ally himself with Great Britain. Fourth and finally he 
only took citizens into account to justify his actions. 
5.5 Zapatero: Preferring a European Constitution 
When the new Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero of the 
canter-left Socialist Party was elected, he tried to separate himself from Aznar policies.   
Consequently, he dramatically reversed some of the foreign policy decisions of the 
prior government, particularly Aznar’s attempt to forge a special relationship with the 
US but also regarding the Mediterranean European Union policy (Field, 2011: 11). 
Concerning the EU Constitutional debate agenda, the main focus of Zapatero was to 
restart negotiations and set up a referendum. 
The reasoning that was used to prompt adoption of the EU Constitution was the 
“absolute priority to return to Europe and with Europe” (Moratinos, ABC, 27 of July 
2004). In his inaugural address, Zapatero declared that the recovery of a pro-Europe 
consensus was a main priority of his foreign policy and the European constitution was 
to be considered a means to achieve this goal. A new closer relationship to France and 
Germany was also considered important and to be at the heart of his European strategy 
(Moratinos, Catalunya, 19 of April 2004). Considering this the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs under Zapatero, Miguel Angel Moratinos stated that it was not necessary for 
Spain to maintain the power which the Nice Treaty conferred upon it three years ago 
(Idem).   
Chari and Gwiazda (2005) stated that even though the PSOE was concerned 
about the blocking minority, they preferred to use in their discourse “influence 
capacity” and omitted from Zapatero’s speeches both the Nice Treaty and Spain’s loss 
of power. During the referendum campaign the issues related with Christian heritage 
and tradition of the European Union also vanished. The areas on which the PP based 
its criticism against a European Constitution were removed (Sampedro et al., 2005). At 
the press conference in Brussels, Zapatero (2004b) observed “that in Europe, People's 
Party was the only who spoke about Nice, and I can assure that in the two days of 
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discussions we've been here (Brussels) I have not heard anyone making reference to 
the Nice Treaty”.  
The new issues that replaced the Nice Treaty and Christianity, were: 
nationalism and “Spain’s responsibility towards Europe”. Both were topics that 
Zapatero consistently referred to in his speeches.  
The recognition of regional languages was a demand that appeared 
simultaneously with the change of government in Spain, probably linked to the support 
that Zapatero received from national parties in the general election (Sampedro et al., 
2005). The government in response gave its assurances that it would defend linguistic 
and cultural development, as well as recognize the official languages of Catalan that is 
the one with the highest population density (Moratinos, La Stampa, 24 of April 2004). 
However, once the Constitution was approved and the demand for greater self-
government was excluded from the treaty, nationalism became an important argument 
for some regional parties to seek the vote against the Constitution. The issue of 
recognition of regional languages, which had been a traditional subject of domestic 
politics in Spain filtered into the European Constitution debate. 
PSOE’s motto to get the Constitution approved was that “Spain has responsibility 
for Europe”. According to Sampredro et al. (2005) this was an abstract argument to 
warn about the dire consequences of a rejection of the referendum. In fact, former 
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez before the elections alerted citizens of a serious crisis 
if the Constitution did not pass (El País, 1 of February 2005). Spanish voters would 
become responsible for the failure of the European Union project, which was precisely 
what the Deputy Prime Minister Maria Teresa Fernandez, lead the voters to believe. 
Fernandez addressed the Spanish citizens that could vote against or abstain from 
voting the Constitution, alerting them that their attitude could have "a high price", 
because "the possibility to have a better Constitution was void” (El País, 14 of 
November 2004).   
On the other hand, the reasons the government gave to attract people to the polls 
and garner support were mainly based on the benefits that citizens could gain with the 
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Constitution. Zapatero (2004c) largely remarked that with the constitution “citizens of 
every EU countries, with no doubt, will have a better future, greater security, liberties 
and rights” (...) as well as will serve to feel closer and involved in the great European 
project”. 
However, even though the government assumed a democratic stance towards the 
EU constitution, Zapatero’s commitment to the referendum appeared to be more a 
continuation of previous consensus rather a radical departure from former policies. 
This is made clear by the government’s rush to vote on the Constitution rather than 
taking some time to inform and explain to its citizens the content and the relevance of 
the text. Zapatero in an interview with the German newspaper Frankfurter (of 
September 2004) hoped that Spain would be one of the first countries to ratify the 
constitution through a referendum. Moreover, when he was asked in Rome for the 
motives to carry out the vote so quickly, even if most of the Spanish people did not 
know or had not even heard about the Constitution, he answered that “Spain should 
fulfill their duties with Europe as soon as possible” and that a “strong campaign of 
information about the content of the constitution and what it represent in historical 
terms, would be convened to society” (Zapatero, 2004c).  
During the first period of Zapatero’s government he had an interesting 
relationship with Spanish citizens concerning the European Union. It was based on a 
compatibility of a similar vision about Europe and the role that Spain should play in 
the integration progress. Even though the government urged citizens to be informed 
and interested, the promotion was mainly meant to accentuate the negative 
consequences of a rejection, rather than to explain the content and why “with the 
constitution citizens would ensured their rights”, as Zapatero often stated. While the 
issue of recognition of languages could have changed the course of the Constitution 
attracting a large segment of society, it did not happen most likely because of the 
exclusion of the demand of greater self-government. The PSOE was not able to 
motivate a large part of the Spanish society mainly because it viewed the public was 
nothing but a tool to achieve its own partisan interests: to restore good relations in 
Europe. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 In first place it is possible to note a change on how governments dealt with 
public opinion. The evidence suggests that this transformation is of high value when 
explaining both the position and the relationship with the public. This could be 
explained on the one hand due to the negotiation styles (consensus versus 
steadfastness), and on the other also because of the dissimilarity in political party 
interests. While PP’s desire was to become one of the most significant players within 
the EU, regardless the cost, Spain under the Socialists was to “return to Europe and 
with Europe”. However, even if the PSOE had a more inclusive discourse with the 
citizenry, the evidence suggest that the negotiations towards a EU constitution were 
largely based on the parties’ ideological pre-disposition to favour deeper integration in 
the EU, rather than to satisfy public opinion. Therefore, it seems there is significant 
difference between both Prime Ministers. 
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6 FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to put the theory into practice by analyzing the cases in the 
light of both Kjell Goldmann’s theory of reconsideration of the incompatible 
hypothesis and Putman’s two-level game theory. The chapter is divided in three 
sections.  The first measures the two different types of foreign policies with respect of 
their democratic level and the second reviews the policies in terms of two-level game 
strategies. Finally, we establish the relation between the process of policy making and 
the way that governments avoid national and international constrains. 
6.2 The Invasion of Iraq and the removal of the 
troops 
Both decisions, first to invade Iraq and then to withdraw troops from the 
conflict, were resolved individually by the then ruling executive powers. Even though 
these actions were in accordance with the Spanish legal framework, neither of them 
included a democratic allocation of values. In contrast, the process of bargaining was 
behind closed doors and left entirely up to partisan hands. Therefore, at first glance, 
both decisions would have fulfilled the first principle of bargaining with outsiders. 
The most obvious implication of the bargaining was that the planning was done 
in great secrecy and restricted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though the 
Spanish people opposed the attack, they only know on the 20
th
 of March of 2003 
whether the attack would even take place. The same problem applies to Zapatero’s 
decision to remove the troops. According to Carlos Ruiz Miguel (2004: 3) the 
resolution of the new Prime Minister was surprising because he did not express 
publicly a final decision to remove troops with the main opposition party or the 
general public (the decision however was taken considering PSOE´s interest and 
consulting this party).  
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Concerning access to information the information available regarding the 
conflict in Iraq, even though the amount of information was substantial, determining 
the degree of truth was very difficult. In a sensitive issue like Iraq, all the information 
could not be communicated to voters and to politicians. Notwithstanding this, the 
Spanish public -as it was stated in previous chapters- had a very strong and 
independent opinion.  
A second implication of the bargaining stance was that the opposition was put 
in a very awkward position. Both the PP and PSOE’s governments tried to 
delegitimize against each other and deprive their adversary of any foreign decision 
with governments. While the Socialists constantly questioned and publicly dismissed 
the legitimacy of the war, the Socialist were in turn accused of acting contrary to 
Spain’s national interests. It is important to remember that Spanish Foreign policy 
under Aznar and Zapatero differed completely from each other. Aznar made a radical 
shift in foreign policy and initiated a new international era moving away from 
continental Europe and toward Britain and the United States. In these moves towards 
Atlanticism the Socialist Party was never considered or consulted as its foreign policy 
agenda was anathema to these objectives. When Zapatero came into office he threw 
the radical PP’s foreign policy decisions “out the window” and never discussed foreign 
policy with them, even though the PSOE repeatedly mentioned that any eventuality 
regarding national defense should be discussed with parliament prior to its 
implementation (Herranz, 2008: 5).  
A third consequence was the difficulty for legislatures to exercise influence 
over the outcomes. It is important to remember that “Spain is a parliamentary 
monarchy where the Constitution reserves foreign and defense policy to the Prime 
Minister” (Michavila, 2005: 7). Therefore the ability of Congress to make foreign 
policy is subject to the executive's capacity given by the Constitution to make 
decisions on this matter regardless of parliament. Consequently, to deploy or withdraw 
the forces from Iraq
22
 required no parliamentary approval. In fact, in none of these 
                                                 
22Among the EU member states, there have been huge differences in regards to parliaments’ 
competencies in security and defense policy. For example, no parliamentary approval is required in 
Spain, Belgium or Greece. In contrast, the consent of parliament prior to any deployment of troops is 
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policies the parliament played an important role. In the words of Brownlie (1980: 4) 
the parliamentary debate “normally involves only retrospective examination of the 
consequences of irrevocable decisions already implemented” (cited in Goldmann, 
1986: 6).  
As a consequence the first principle underlying the incompatibility hypothesis is 
met. Neither Aznar nor Zapatero consulted parliament to authorize or ratify the use of 
or withdrawal of Spanish Armed Forces in Iraq. As a consequence, the bargaining 
position assumed by the executives resulted in very small minorities implementing 
their attitudes towards defense policy. They were undermined by either the position of 
the opposition or the break in continuity of Spanish foreign policy. Furthermore, the 
assertion that foreign policy cannot be made by the legislature suggest that 
bureaucratic participation in policy making is limited to implementation. 
After Iraq however, according to Ortega (2004: 28), sending any further 
peacekeepers underwent subsequent approval by the Congress of Deputies. By virtue 
of this ratification, the principle of bargaining loses some relevance because defense 
[foreign] policy under Zapatero became slightly more democratic. The choice to 
remove the troops was perceived as a response of the initiatives of activists and the 
opinion of the general public. This also reveals that the making of defense policy 
became more participative.  
Recalling the principle of the supreme interest, Aznar’s philosophy towards 
defense foreign policy may well be characterized along the lines of realism and the 
principle of the supreme interest. This is embodied in three ways: first, as Aznar 
considered national and international terrorism to be the main threat to the nation’s 
existence and integrity, he thought these foreign policy questions were too central to 
the survival of the state to be beholden to them. Secondly, security and defense 
became the driving force of the Spanish foreign policy as well as the main means to 
achieve Aznar’s major goal: to be at the forefront of Europe. Thirdly, as a consequence 
                                                                                                                                                        
required in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and many of the new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, even two-thirds of the Members of Parliament must vote in 
favor of a deployment. (Wagner, 2006; 204) 
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of the two previous points, he also assumed that the public would stand united behind 
him. 
Unlike Aznar, Rodriguez Zapatero did not consider the war against terrorism 
(international) as a supreme state interest; he instead seemed to follow the will of the 
electorate. In contrast, for Zapatero the war on Iraq was not compulsory but optional 
and opposed by domestic actors. Once again, defense [foreign] policy under Zapatero 
appears to be more democratic. 
With regard to the principle of remoteness, today’s defense policy cannot be 
considered as remote and apart from bread and butter issues anymore. Wars have very 
obvious implications for everybody since they imply casualties and high financial 
costs. Security is expensive; this money could have been used for other purposes such 
as dealing with unemployment, education, regional development, etc. (Goldmann, 
1985: 30). Hence, this principle is not applicable neither to Aznar’s decision to “shoot 
out” in Iraq or to Zapatero’s policy to “boot out” the war.    
As shown in table 6.1, the difference between Aznar and Zapatero is clear.  
Even though the three principles analyzed fail to operate jointly the PP policy style is 
much more in accordance with the incompatibility hypothesis than the PSOE’s is. 
Zapatero’s prompt decision to bring the Spanish military back home was a 
representative decision of voter’s demands. The fact that after Iraq, parliament’s 
approval was needed for further military and humanitarian action meant that defense 
policy became a policy almost like standard domestic policy. 
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Table 6.1: The three principles of the incompatibility hypothesis applied to defense policy 
 
Bargaining Supreme interest Remoteness 
  PP’s Government  
Invasion of Iraq Yes Yes No 
 PSOE’s Government 
Removal of the troops 
Open to Parliament 
debate after Iraq 
invasion 
No 
Subject to pressures and not 
central to the survival of 
Spain 
No 
 
 
Table 6.2: The three principles of democracy applied to defense policy 
 Invasion of Iraq Troop’s removal 
Representation malfunctions, no consensus Relatively well functioning 
Participation primarily bureaucratic Political policy making 
Information Rich/ Incomplete? Rich/ Incomplete? 
 
 
6.3 The European Constitution 
 The policy making of the European Constitution during both the administration 
of Aznar and Zapatero, was according to Chari et al. (2004: 11)  highly centralized 
around three principal actors: “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister 
Office, and the Ministry of Economy (MEH). The first played a key role in terms of 
coordinating the position, while the other two players informed, guided, supervised or 
supported the actions of Foreign Affairs at various stages of the process” (See the 
figure 6.1). Other potential participants, including opposition parties, regional interests 
and other social actors, were excluded from the process. The Parliament on the other 
hand, was not taken into account either. In this sense, the principle of bargaining is 
also applicable to the process of the European Constitution.  
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 Notwithstanding the negotiating behind closed doors, the low participation in 
the process of negotiation was outdone by higher involvement of both parliament and 
citizens in the post-choice
23
 evaluation stage of foreign policy making. Spain held a 
consultative referendum and passed legislation through parliament in order to be 
approved with a qualified majority. In this sense the measure was also representative.  
 The reason for maintaining a closed-bargaining stance seemed to be explained 
mainly by the high level of complexity and technicality of the negotiation, rather than 
considering the EU Constitution as a sensitive issue, as was the case with the War in 
Iraq.   
 Because of the elevated level of specificity and knowledge required for 
negotiations, the amount  of information the government had was far greater than the 
average citizen. As shown in chapter four, there was a very low level of knowledge 
about the content of the constitution which was not due to the level of education, but 
because both the government and the parties failed or refused to transmit the 
information. This was clearly illustrated by the elitist way that the information 
concerning the European Constitution was treated in the three biggest Spanish 
newspapers.  
One of the foreign policy principles explaining the poor flow of information in 
the making of the EU constitution may be the principle of supreme interest. This 
means evoking the premise of the common interest, when the continuity and survival 
of the nation is at risk in foreign policy. Regarding the EU Constitution, even though 
the existence of Spain was not at stake per say, personal and political party interests of 
Socialist and Popular Party as well as and their leaders were in danger.  
                                                 
23
 According to Goldmann (1986: 20) post-choice stage consist in implementation but it may also 
encompass evaluation. 
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Representatives of all Ministries coordinated 
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Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
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European Affairs 
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Permanent Units 
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Governmental Policy 
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Minister of Foreign affairs 
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Prime Minister’s Office: 
International Relations 
and Security Department 
Figure 6.1: Spain Domestic policy coordination in the European Constitution negotiation 
(Source: Chari & Egea; 2006) 
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  For the Popular Party the Constitution might have given Spain more 
weight in Europe. However, accepting a constitution in terms of the Convention 
would have relegate Spain from the "grown-ups' table" to the "children's table 
and also taken Aznar out of the picture of the Azores. This was the reason why it 
was so important for him to keep the public uninformed. The fact that Zapatero 
attempted to carry out a non-binding referendum as soon as possible, proved that 
Prime Minister chose to ride the supportive climate of public opinion to get the 
Constitution legitimatized and did not try to educated the electorate about the 
pros and cons of the text.  
 As analyzed in previous chapters, even though there was general support 
expressed by 78 percent of voters that backed the Constitution, the public 
accepted the EU Constitution passively rather than actively. Only 42 percent of 
the electorate went to vote. This can be explained because of the low level of 
knowledge but also because the implications of the constitution were seen as 
remote, indirect and less immediate. The low interest for the constitution could 
be explained by the third notion accounting for the incompatibility hypothesis: 
the principle of remoteness. 
 An important consequence of the bargaining position is that the opposition 
is isolated from the policy making. Regarding the negotiation of the EU 
Constitution, even though both parties agreed to rally support for the constitution 
the months before the referendum, during the preliminary
24
 negotiations both the 
PP and PSOE weakened theirs political opponent’s standing. Neither of the 
political parties considered the possibility that it may itself form the next 
government and that continuity in foreign policy is an asset for every country. 
Even though opposition parties as well as regional governments were willing to 
compromise on the EU Constitution in order to attain consensus between all 
member states, the PP centralized the process and did what they deemed 
convenient for Spain. Zapatero strove at all costs to get a European Constitution 
                                                 
24
 Known as well as the agenda setting and denotes introducing new issues into the decision-
making process. 
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for Spain even if it reduced Spain’s blocking capacity; leaving aside the PP’s 
efforts to achieve a text that benefits the country bargaining position among the 
European Union members. This called into question PP’s legitimacy and party 
program in the eyes of Zapatero’s government.  
  As in the case of Iraq, Zapatero unlike Aznar seemed to follow the will of 
the electorate. The new Socialist Prime Minister approved the European 
Constitution due to the fact that it would have meant more integration and a 
common European citizenship; both aspects were highly desirable among 
Spanish. Zapatero also submitted the constitution to referendum making the 
process more representative and participatory. However the fact that he avoided 
informing the citizens and conducted the popular consultation hastily, shows that 
the new government rather than democratizing a foreign policy was taking 
advantage of the favorable context to achieve PSOE’s goal: the recovery of a 
pro-European consensus.  
As a consequence, Zapatero exploited democracy as a function of the 
party power and as Aznar did, instrumentalized the constitution. He took citizens 
into account to legitimize the party’s program and to show his government as 
being democratic. In the table below the small differences between Aznar and 
Zapatero confirm that despite the change in government there was stability in the 
process. In this respect, there was not much difference between the positions 
taken by both the PP and PSOE administrations. 
 
Table 6.3: The three principles of the incompatibility hypothesis applied to 
internationalist policy 
 Bargaining Supreme interest Remoteness 
  PP’s Government  
Rejection of the 
Constitution 
Yes No Yes 
  PSOE’s Government  
Approval of the 
Yes, but open to 
Parliament and 
No Yes 
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Constitution public debate after 
approval 
 
 
Table 6.4: The three principles of democracy applied to internationalist policy 
 Rejection of the Constitution Approval of the Constitution 
Representation malfunctions, no consensus malfunctions 
Participation primarily bureaucratic bureaucratic during the pre-choice/ 
Tripartite during the post-choice 
Information Incomplete Incomplete 
 
 
 In this section we have tried to determine the democratic level of two 
different types of foreign policies as well as the principles of the incompatibility 
hypothesis and where they are encountered. In the following section, on the 
individual level, the policies are reviewed in terms of two-level game strategies 
and to what extent leaders play them. 
6.4 José Maria Aznar 
  Prime Minister José Maria Aznar played a two-level game in two 
instances when negotiating the European Union Constitution. Concerning the 
war in Iraq however, he did not try to maximize his degree of freedom or to 
satisfy domestic pressures or limit the harmful impact of the war.  
 Aznar did not seem to be afraid of being evicted from his seat even if he 
was threatened by great opposition which condemned the invasion of Iraq. He 
was convinced that the war against terrorism was Spain’s responsibility and was 
therefore impossible to avoid and unnecessary to justify. In this sense, he could 
not and did not try to explain the reasons for invading Iraq. 
 With regard to the bargaining of the European Constitution, Aznar’s 
government expanded his own level II win-set. While on the one hand he wisely 
exploited public ignorance, on the other he tied his hands on the national level.  
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 It was well known that the Spanish public was supportive of many 
European Union initiatives and that the constitution was not an exception. From 
the perspective of Putnam’s two-level framework a level I negotiator will deny 
any concession if there is supportive public opinion with the other level I 
negotiator. However, by keeping the public misinformed they gained some level 
of control over the public and rejected any of the ideas that ran against Aznar’s 
ambitions. That is why in the constitutional debate there was not an important 
political issues put forth such as regionalism which could have mobilized many 
citizens.  
 It is clear that Aznar played a two-level game so as to subvert supportive 
public opinion towards the European Constitution and to walk away from Spain’s 
traditional alliance with the Franco-German axis. The paradox is that Aznar used 
the public as an excuse when he discarded the constitution, arguing that he could 
not accept a constitutional project that in a popular referendum could be rejected. 
Regarding the invasion of Iraq, Aznar, rather than trying to convince the Spanish 
public about the necessity of the war or to find others ways to change their 
perceptions, he disregarded Spain’s citizenry. He did not even try to link the 
international with the national level.  
6.5  Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
 When discussing and making foreign policy decisions Zapatero took 
advantage of both the domestic and the international level. The Socialist Leader 
constantly sought to maximize his degree of freedom and satisfy domestic 
pressures. The former occurred mainly in the approval of the European 
Constitution while the latter case of the removal of Spanish troops from Iraq.  
 Concerning the European Constitution, Zapatero used several two-level 
game strategies. As a clever player he harnessed the general support that public 
opinion had for the Constitution. He recognized the benefits that supportive 
opinion would have in expanding a level II win-set and thus, approved the 
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constitution without demanding many concessions from the other negotiating 
parties. In fact, nearly three month later he was satisfied with the outcomes of the 
Intergovernmental Conference and gave the “go-ahead” for the text to be 
approved by the European Council.  
 He also took advantage of positive opinion and exploited public ignorance 
as did Aznar; this enhanced flexibility on the International level by “cutting 
slack” in the ratification process.  
 The way in which Zapatero explained the Constitution was confined 
exclusively to inform about the benefits that citizens gained rather than giving 
information about the content. The justifications given by Zapatero to his 
constituency to get the sufficient votes were transmitted mainly through a 
negative approach. The fact that the PSOE alerted the public to the adverse 
consequences of rejection and blamed them for a possible failure of the European 
Union project showed the government played the game to both, rally support 
from the public and avert the unsupportive climate. Blaming and censuring was, 
thus, the means through which the party enhanced its flexibility with public 
opinion.  
 The reason why the government chose to call a referendum (and then 
submitted to ratification) could also be explained by the two-level game theory. 
The government knowing that the public backed the constitution and that this 
support did not depend on political parties, exploited democracy to confer 
legitimacy to its adoption and strengthen
25
 its powers not just domestically but 
also internationally.  In fact, by "cutting slack," loosening binding domestic 
constraints in the ratification process (Moravcsik, 1994: 2), the governments 
could improve the prospects of intergovernmental cooperation. This is due to, as 
                                                 
25
 In words of Bogdanor: “In general, where the government has discretion as to whether to call 
a referendum, the referendum will strengthen the government… Where the power to call a 
referendum lies in the hands of government, it is likely to prove a tactical weapon in 
strengthening its powers” (1994: 31). 
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mentioned in chapter three, the larger the Level II win-sets the greater the chance 
of a Level I agreement.  
The two-level game played by Zapatero for the removal of the troops was 
diametrically opposed to the strategies used during the making of the European 
Constitution. While in the latter instance, the government constantly tried to 
extend its room for maneuver on the domestic level and sought to widen the 
scope of foreign policy decisions. In the former, Zapatero used the reduced 
domestic leeway in order to strengthen or at least maintain the respective 
government’s international bargaining position.  
Zapatero mentioned that the general public was a crucial audience on 
which his “Iraq win-set” depended. It was the high level of opposition against the 
military operation in Iraq, and the bombings in Madrid that were linked to 
Spanish foreign policy, that influenced Zapatero’s behavior towards the two 
levels actors.  
The newly elected Prime Minister feared to displease the public and to be 
removed from office, as was Aznar. Thus, he adopted the same ideological 
position as his domestic fellow players. However and at the same time, in order 
to limit the harmful impact on Spain’s international bargaining position Zapatero 
repetitively made mention that his hands were tied on the domestic level.   
 Finally, the last strategy was to use side payments to attract marginal 
supporters. The fact that the recognition of languages was included in the debate 
of the constitution was, in fact, just to catch the attention of a larger segment to 
the election and to increase positive opinion.   
 In overall, it is clear that Zapatero played a two-level game so as to limit 
international pressures. He took advantage of both supportive and obstructive 
public opinion, however in different ways. While he tied his hands on the 
national level to deliberately reduce Spain’s international leeway, concerning the 
Constitution the Prime Minister cut some slack in the ratification process to seek 
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international cooperation. Zapatero, therefore, consistently tried to link the 
international with the national level.  
6.5.1 Comparison between Aznar and Zapatero 
 Comparing both the governments of Aznar and Zapatero, shown in table 
6.5, it is evident that PP’s Prime Minister did not play the two-level game that his 
Socialist successor did. Aznar, in fact, did not even try to justify or reduce the 
harmful consequences of his actions when invading Iraq. Zapatero in contrast, 
followed level II actors when withdrawing the troops from Iraq. 
 When rejecting and approving the EU Constitution, Aznar and Zapatero, 
respectively, tried to convince players on level I that theirs win set was small. 
Additionally, both prime Ministers exploited the Spanish people´s ignorance. 
However, Zapatero rallied support from his constituency and cut slack in the 
ratification process. 
Table 6.5: Comparing two-level game strategies between Aznar and Zapatero in the 
Iraq and the EU Constitution cases 
Aznar Zapatero 
TWO-LEVEL GAME STRATEGIES Iraq EUC Iraq EUC 
Rally support from one’s constituency No No No Yes 
Ride unsupportive climate of opinion No No No No 
Convince the other that his win-set is small No Yes Yes No 
Informed negotiators can exploit ignorance No Yes No Yes 
Use side payments to attract marginal 
supporters 
No No No Yes 
“Cutting slack” in the ratification process No No No Yes 
“Tying one’s hands” on the international level  No No Yes No 
“Tying one’s hands” on the national level  No No Yes No 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
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 Putnam’s general model suggested that governments on the one hand seek 
international self-binding when they are weak at home and want to strengthen 
their international bargaining position. Then on the other hand they search for 
national self-binding when they are weak in the international level and want to 
strengthen their national bargaining position.  
 The first supposition does not seem to be fulfilled in any of the cases 
analyzed. Even though Aznar lacked domestic approval he did not want to have 
any second level for political risk and burden sharing. Zapatero in contrast, 
enjoyed public approval for both foreign policies and still he sought international 
cooperation in the European Union.  
 In connection with the second assumption, while Aznar considered his 
constituency very little, Zapatero searched for national self-binding in the case of 
Iraq to justify his position at the international level, primarily to the United States 
and the UK as those most affected by its decision.    
 Summarizing, while Aznar used the two-level game only for rejecting the 
Constitution, Zapatero to achieve what he wanted nationally used both the 
international and national level. The latter confirms that Zapatero on the one 
hand mindful of the harshness of public opinion, followed the will of Spanish 
citizens; in relation to the EU Constitution he and Aznar used the context to 
accomplish party and personal goals. 
 The comparative analysis of the two foreign political decisions during the 
administrations of Aznar and Zapatero reveal, first, that an executive who plays 
at first level more that at the second level appears to make the process of foreign 
policy making more democratic. In contrast to this, executives who play at the 
second level more that at the first level appear to make the process less 
democratic. Executives who do not use any two-level game strategies play their 
own game. 
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7 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Leaders can use or ignore public opinion  
 The liberal school’s argument was that public opinion shapes foreign 
policy decisions by setting and identifying a range of policies in which decision 
makers could choose (Rusett, 1990; Risse-Kappen, 1991). Contrary to this 
assumption and consistent with the analysis conducted in this paper it has been 
found that at times public opinion can fail to effectively rein in foreign policy 
decisions due to the fact that elites either might disregard the majority and refuse 
to pay attention to their preferences; or that  they manipulate and make use of 
them. While Jose Maria Aznar greatly ignored the majority when invading Iraq, 
he as well as Rodriguez Zapatero used and exploited Spanish public opinion to 
get the European Constitution first rejected and then approved in a national 
referendum. 
 Even if the Spanish public was highly opposed to sending troops to Iraq, 
Aznar regardless of the cost, overlooked the popular and prevailing sentiment 
and made the decision to invade based solely on his personal desire; that being to 
make Spain one of the most significant players within the EU. He acted as if he 
had authority over defense policy decisions and was not compelled by majority 
opinion. Consequently he did not care either to seek a second level agreement to 
the share risk or to engage in blame avoidance and credit claiming exercises to 
selectively mobilize domestic support for his policy. Aznar in other words, did 
what he considered was the best for himself and for his party. For this reason he 
did not play the two-level game either in diverting the attention of the public or 
to persuading them.  
 Regarding the rejection of and then the approval of the European 
Constitution the Spanish citizens were by a large majority indifferent, reflected in 
both low participation in the referendum and a lack of knowledge about the 
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content of the text. However, even though the public was apathetic, Zapatero and 
Aznar to a lesser extent, used the public to justify their positions.  
 The most striking strategy Zapatero used was to utilize side payments to 
attract marginal supporters and introducing themes of national interest like 
regionalism. Including the recognition of regional languages as a demand 
Zapatero intended the Spanish voters to feel that their concerns were reflected 
and made them think he followed their wishes. Nonetheless, he only gave an 
appearance of responsiveness, he instead manipulated supportive public opinion 
to achieve party ambitions: to reverse some Aznar´s foreign policies and to 
realign Spain with the European Union.  
 Aznar used two-level game strategies mainly to exploit ignorance and to 
expand his level II win-set. However, the paradox is that he also, depending on 
the circumstances, tried to convince the other parties’ negotiators that his level II 
win-set was small by arguing that the constitution could not be accepted by his 
constituency. Accordingly, Aznar, unlike Zapatero, used the international level 
more than the national to justify his action and to minimize negative 
implications. 
 The ability of public opinion to affect and shape foreign policy decision 
can still be questioned as it has been proven that leaders sometimes simply ignore 
the majority or make use of different strategies to either exploit supportive public 
opinion or overcome bothersome public opinion.   
7.2 Public opinion is responsive to elite 
manipulation  
According to the realist school’s argument public opinion is a volatile 
mood that lacks in structure, is incoherent and irrational (Lippmann, 1955; 
Almond, 1956), and is therefore, notoriously fickle and responsive to elite 
manipulation (Foyle, 1983). Even though it has not been possible to conclude 
when public opinion is rational, coherent and structured, through this 
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investigation it was feasible to identify that the attitude at least towards the 
conflict in Iraq was stable, strong and citizens gave an active judgment against 
the war. Concerning the European Constitution it was also observed that the 
public opinion was constant and stable over time.  
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, people were receptive to manipulation 
specifically in regards to the European Constitution referendum. In fact, due to 
the growing demand to recognize regional languages, Zapatero regardless of the 
difficulty to include the claim in the Constitutional text, promised to embrace and 
defend this petition for greater self-government. He unfortunately managed by 
artful and unfair means (through the game of two-level) to gain advantage and 
serves his own, but mainly his party’s interests.  
In the case of the EU Constitution the public was nothing but a tool for 
Zapatero to achieve PSOE’s policy ends, we might conclude that he increasingly 
made use of the public to create an appearance of responsiveness rather than 
actually respond to their wishes. In other words Payne (2007) is right when 
saying that elites can simply manipulate rhetoric to assure wider support for their 
desired policies. 
7.3 The removal of the troops from Iraq is the 
exception  
 Among the cases, the removal of the troops is the exception, one, because 
public opinion exerts a substantial influence on the policy. Two because public 
officials respond to the will of the people when formulating the policy, and three 
due to the fact that Prime Minister Zapatero was empowered by public opinion. 
 The explanation as to why Aznar and Zapatero were affected differently 
by the same public opinion might largely be found in the fact that the parties had 
divergent and opposing foreign policy agendas. However, the decisive factor is 
might be that PP’s Prime Minister was removed from his seat.  
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 Based on the analysis of survey data it is possible to presume that the 
Madrid attacks had an impact on the voting conduct of the Spanish electorate. 
Because the government was blamed for the attacks and also condemned as self-
interested for involving Spain in a war that it was not theirs, a new government 
with a different vision was chosen. Zapatero in order not to suffer the same fate 
as his predecessor had no other option than to pay attention to public opinion. 
This meant removing the troops from Iraq as soon as possible. This rapid 
decision, even though could have had a negative impact with allies, received 
wide approval among the Spanish citizenry empowering Zapatero and elevating 
his popularity.  
 Overall, Zapatero was compelled to respond to the will of the people when 
it was impossible to ignore or manipulate their preferences. Even if he “tied his 
hands” with the international level to reduce Spain´s international leeway, at the 
national level he did not use any of the two-level game strategies to justify any of 
his actions. In other words, Zapatero did not attempt to deny or minimize the 
negative implication of the events.     
7.4 Generally speaking, foreign policy is 
undemocratic 
 According to the definition of democracy, which is citizens’ right to have 
their opinion heard, generally speaking, foreign policy is undemocratic. Apart 
from Zapatero´s decision to remove the troops from Iraq none of the foreign 
policies analyzed followed the preferences of the voters.  
 Kjell Goldmann mentioned that foreign policy making is concerned with 
democratic issues depending on the type and substance of the policy. In line with 
his classification, the invasion of and withdrawal from Iraq characterized as a 
defense policy should have concerned ordinary people and therefore tended to be 
more democratic. The European Constitution in contrast, defined as an 
internationalist policy, the public should not have been strongly concerned with 
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the consequences of the policy, being consequently less attentive to policy 
making. 
 Goldmann is correct in this concern regarding defense policy. The 
invasion of Iraq and then the removal of the troops were important to Spanish 
citizens and they were active in the making of the policy. Even though Aznar was 
able to deploy forces in Iraq without consulting the public and despite the great 
opposition, the people were able to sanction him and to stop this measure through 
protest and elections. In fact, Aznar’s policy against terrorism caused him to step 
down from power and that Zapatero with quickly removed the Spanish military 
from the war in Iraq.  
 Goldman stated that the internationalist policy was the least democratic 
and, in fact, it was. The Prime Ministers did not encourage people to be informed 
nor did they struggle for the inclusion of issues that were important to the 
Spanish citizens.  Even though Zapatero submitted the constitution to referendum 
making the process more participatory, setting up elections was more a 
continuation of former policies. Zapatero and Aznar therefore do not appear to be 
very different in this aspect since both exploited democracy as a function of the 
party power and personal interests, respectively.  
7.5 In conclusion 
 Spanish policy making is a result of both bottom up processes wherein 
leaders are responsive to public opinion; and of bottom down process wherein 
leaders ignore public opinion; as well as a process in which leaders managed to 
manipulate the public opinion to ensure that policies that they supported were 
pursued. Consequently, rather than a simple unidirectional causal flow between 
leaders and their constituency in policy making, the relation moves in both 
directions whereas the public provides the basis for elite strategies.  
 As shown in the figure below, Aznar and Zapatero had both opposing 
reactions to public opinion and very similar ones. The reason can be given by the 
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room foreign policy permits the public to participate, the importance that the 
policy could have for the government and the level the citizens are concerned 
about the policy. The relation between policy makers and public opinion is 
provided by both the type of the policy and the two-level game strategies.   
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A: Aznar (Invasion of Iraq)       
B: Aznar (Rejection of the EU Constitution) 
C: Zapatero (Removal of the troops from Iraq)        
D: Zapatero (Approval of the EU Constitution) 
 
Figure 7.1: Policy making versus public opinion in Spain  
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1: New voters in the general elections of 2000/2004 
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Figure 2: Perception of Spain´s Political Situation  
 
 
 
Source: Compilation based on CIS opinion polls 
